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THE LEGAL CONTEXT OF WATER USER
ASSOCIATIONS IN NEPAL - ANALYSIS AND
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
ANDREW ALLAN t
ABSTRACT

Implementation of sustainable irrigation systems to increase agricultural production is a stated aim of the Nepali government. Although participatory irrigation management (PIM) is integral to the
strategy, the Nepali government has encountered problems implementing this system. One reason for these problems is the lack of an
adequate regulatory framework. This article sets out the current legislative environment with respect to PIM and water use management,
highlighting those areas where practice fails to match policy. In addition, the article suggests a series of detailed improvements to the water
allocation process and to governance at all levels, bearing in mind the
current political situation in Nepal.
ABBREVIATIONS USED
DOI
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WRA
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Department of Irrigation
Electricity Act 2049
Environment Protection Act 2053
Environment Protection Rules 2053
Hydropower Development Policy 2049
His Majesty's Government
Irrigation Regulations 2056 (as revised,
February 2004 - unofficial translation)
Local Self-Governance Act 2055
Village Development Committee
Water Resources Act 2049
Water Resources Regulations 2049

t Andrew Allan is a Teaching and Research Fellow at the International Water
Law Research Institute ("IWLRI") at the University of Dundee, Scotland
(a.a.allan@dundee.ac.uk). This paper is based on work done by the author as part of
the DFID-funded KaR project R8032. The author is grateful for the helpful comments,
rapid translations, and practical information provided during the preparation of this
report by Simon Howarth of Mott Macdonald, Basistha Raj Adhikari, Umesh Nath
Parajuli of the Nepali Department of Irrigation, and Dr. Patricia Wouters of the
TWLRI. Any errors, however, are the author's own.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Nepali government is anxious to increase the efficiency of agricultural production to meet the demands of its growing population.'
Currently only 17 percent of the cultivated area in the country is irrigated all year round and there is, therefore, a significant need to extend the existing network of irrigation systems to improve efficiency.2
His Majesty's Government (HMG) regards PIM as an essential requirement in meeting its target of year-round irrigation of 90 percent
of irrigable lands by 2027.' Historically, farmer-managed groups
(FMIS) in Nepal implemented PIM, but, in recent years, agency or
joint-managed systems have increasingly implemented PIM as well,
though the latter failed to match the productivity of the former.' One
of the reasons for the comparative lack of success of agency and jointmanaged systems is the absence of a strong regulatory foundation: the
legislation that put into place is often ignored or not enforced. The
lack of a strong regulatory foundation occurs for several reasons, for
example: the legislation lacks detail in crucial areas; the necessary financial resources are not available to those enforcing or obeying the
provisions; and the rules are contradictory or inconsistent. To address
these problems, this article assesses both law and policy related to irrigation management in Nepal, focusing on the particular issues raised
by agency and joint-managed irrigation systems. The article investigates broader water use management practices to highlight the fact
that irrigation management does not exist in a vacuum, but rather irrigation management affects other water uses just as other water uses
affect irrigation management. The article is based on a review of relevant legislation in Nepal and the advice of local experts, which the author followed-up on by conducting a fact-finding mission to Nepal in
November 2003. In conclusion, the article suggests solutions and remedial actions with respect to the difficulties identified. Where appropriate, the article analyzes remedies applied in other parts of the
world in an effort to resolve similar problems.

1. See
Irrigation
Policy,
2060
§§
1.1-1.2
(Nepal),
http://www.doi.gov.np/irrigation-policy.pdf (last visited May 1, 2005) [hereinafter
Irrigation Policy]. See also WATER ENERGY COMM'N SECRETARIAT, WATER RESOURCES
STRATEGY, para. 1.1 (Kathmandu 2002) [hereinafter WATER RESOURCES STRATEGY].
2.

WATER RESOURCES STRATEGY, supra note 1, at para. 2.4.2 (stating that out of a

total cultivated area of 2,642,000ha, it is possible to irrigate 1,766,000ha, of the possible
irrigable area 452,000ha are actually irrigated). See also Irrigation Policy § 1.3.1. See
WATER REsOURCES STRATEGY, supra note 1, at ch. 2 (providing further details of the
hydrographic and economic context in Nepal).
3.

WATER RESOURCES STRATEGY, supra note

1, at para. 6.5.

4. See, e.g., Ashutosh K, Shukla, Policies, Processes, and Performance of Management
1Turnover and Agency-Initiated Interventions, in IMPROVING IRRIGATION GOVERNANCE AND
MANAGEMENT IN NEPiAL 75, 76, 84-85 (Ganesh P. Shivakoti & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2002).
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Introduction to the Legislation
The Water Resources Act (WRA) is the regulatory regime that
largely governs water use management in Nepal and sets out the general principles to be applied to water resource management.' The Act
includes broad provisions related to the ownership of water and the
establishment of Water User Associations (WUAs). WUAs are organisations formed by groups of individuals who wish to use of water resources on a collective basis.6
In Nepal, certain water uses are licensable while others are exempt.
Two pieces of secondary legislation set out more detailed licence application rules, one dealing with irrigation management, one with the
8
exempt uses,' and the other with licensable activities. Further legislation addresses one specific licensable activity, electricity generation,
while the Environmental Protection Act'" and its subsidiary rules govern broader environmental control."
In addition to legislation, the Muluki Ain, which codified the law of
Nepal in 1854 and again in 1963, affects water use management. The
Muluki Ain contains a chapter dedicated to irrigation management,
portions of which are consistent with the current legislation'" while

5.

Water Resources Act, 2049 pmbl. (1992) (Nepal), reprinted in ELEC. DEV. CTR.,

NEPALESE LEGAL PROVISIONS ON HYDRO-POWER DEVELOPMENT

15 (1996) [hereinafter

Water Resources Act].

6.

Id.§5.

7. Irrigation Regulation, 2056 R. 1 (2004) (Nepal) [hereinafter Irrigation Regulation]. No official English translation of this latest version was available at the time of
publication. The author has, therefore, used an unofficial translation along with the
official translation of the previous version dated 2000. The author is grateful to Dr.
Umesh Nath Parajuli for his translation of the 2004 edition.
8. Nepal permits establishment of WUAs with respect to licensable activities, but
the Water Resources Regulations govern the issuance of licenses. See Water Resources
Regulation, 2050 §§ 8, 14, 20 (1993) (Nepal), reprinted in ELEC. DEv. CrR., NEPALESE
LEGAL PROVISIONS ON HYDRO-POWER DEVELOPMENT 145 (1996) [hereinafter Water Resources Regulation]; see also infta Part Il.B.1. (discussing the current state of the licensing process).
Electricity Act, 2049 pmbl., § 3 (1992) (Nepal), reprinted in ELEC. DEv. CTR.,
9.
NEPALESE LEGAL PROVISIONS ON HYDRO-POWER DEVELOPMENT 29

(1996)

[hereinafter

Electricity Act].
(Nepal),
(1997)
2053
Act,
Protection
10. Environment
9
http://www.mope.gov.np/environment/act 7.php (last visited May 1, 2005) [hereinafter Environment Protection Act].
(Nepal),
1997
Rules,
Protection
11. Environment
7
http://www.mope.gov.np/environment/rule9 .php (last visited May 1, 2005) [hereinafter Environment Protection Rules].
12. For example, the rule that a new irrigation canal can be constructed upstream
of another canal only if it does not harm the downstream one is consistent with current
legislation. See § K. Khadka, Water Use and Water Rights in Nepal: Legal Perspective, in
WATER RIGHTS, CONFLICT AND POLiCY 23 (Rajendra Pradhan et al. eds., 1997).
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other portions directly contradict current legislation.'" The current
status of the Muliki Ain is unclear: although subsequent legislation has
not expressly repealed it, the two are not always consistent. In the absence of available information regarding the Nepali courts' treatment
of the Muluki Ain,'4 this article concentrates on the current legislation
as much as possible.
I.

OWNERSHIP AND ALLOCATION (IN RELATION TO BOTH
WATER RESOURCES AND LAND)
A. OWNERSHIP

1. Water
The Water Resources Act vests ownership of Nepal's water resources in the Kingdom of Nepal: "[tihe ownership of the water resources available in the Kingdom of Nepal shall be vested in the Kingdom of Nepal."" For the purposes of the Water Resources Act, "water
resources" include all surface and groundwater and water in any other
form. 6
2. Land
Both private individuals and WUAs formed under the Water Resources Act have the capacity to own land and moveable property."
With respect to land registration, no central cadastral system exists as
registration takes place only at the local District Land Revenue Office.
As regards to ownership of canals, those the Department of Irrigation
(DOI) constructed remain vested with the DOI. The DOI may only
transfer management responsibilities to WUAs, although the extent of
transfer depends on the terms of the transfer agreement.
B.ALLOCATION

The Water Resources Act, Water Resources Regulations" (WRR),
and the Electricity Act" (EA) set out a system for allocating water use
13. The "first come, first serve" rule with respect to irrigation waters is not conducive to ensuring that tail farmers, for example, have access to irrigation water. Id. at 15.
14. Bishal and Santosh outline the Supreme Court's water-related decisions during
the period 1980-90, and note that the Supreme Court recognised customary water
rights, but they do not include an analysis of decisions made after the enactment of the
Water Resources Act in 1992. See § Bishal & K.C. Santosh, Analysis of Supreme Court
Cases and Decisions Related to Water Rights in Nepal, in WATER RIGHTS, CONFLICT AND
POLICY 47-62 (Rajendra Pradhan et al. eds., 1997).
15. Water Resources Act § 3.
16. Id.§ 2(a).
17. Id. § 6(3).
18. Id.
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rights through licensing and registration. Since practices deviate from
the letter of the law somewhat, this section describes the legislative
provisions relating to licensing assuming the government actually enforced the law. Later sections describe how the practical situation differs from the legal ideal.
The WRA's default position is to require a licence for all water
utilisation."° The following uses, however, are exempt from this requirement:
(a) For one's own drinking and other domestic [sic] use on an individual or collective basis,
(b)For the irrigation of one's own land on an individual or collective
basis,
(c) For the purpose of running water-mill or water grinder as cottage
industry [sic],
(d) For the use of boat [sic] on personal basis for local transportation,
(e)For the use, as prescribed, of the water resources confined to a
land [sic] by the owner of such land."

In the light of these exemptions, the principal water use that still
requires a licence is hydropower." Further provisions contained in the
Electricity Act, however, exempt national and corporate hydroelectric
power projects with a capacity of less than 1000 kilowatts." Notably,
19. Electricity Act §§ 4-9. See also Hydro-power Development Policy, 1992 § 4(a)(1)(2) (1992) (Nepal), reprinted in ELEC. DEv. CTR., NEPALESE LEGAL PROVISIONS ON HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT 1 (1996) [hereinafter Hydro-power Development Policy].
20. The Water Resources Act states "[n]o person shall be entitled to utilize the
water resources without obtaining a license under this Act." Water Resources Act §

4(1). The Water Resources Regulation underlines this, stating "[t ] he licensee, who has
obtained license for the works relating to utilization of water resources under this

Regulation, shall have the right to use the water resources for the works as mentioned
in the license to the extent of water resources of such place and area as specified in the
license." Water Resources Regulation R. 22.
21.
Water Resources Act § 4(2).
22. This Nepalese regulatory structure ignores commercial navigation, another
major potential use of a watercourse, because commercial navigation is nonexistent in
Nepal. Additionally, Nepal seems to require a license for uses such as fish farming.
But see infra Part II.B.1. (discussing the current state of the licensing process).
23. The Act reads:
[N]o license shall be required to be obtained by a national or a corporate
body for the generation, transmission or distribution of electricity up to 1000
kilowatt[s] and for conducting necessary survey thereof. Before generating,
transmitting or distributing hydroelectricity of the capacity ranging from 100
kilowatt[s] to 1000 kilowatt[s], information to that effect shall be given to the

prescribed officer in a manner as prescribed.
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the Water Resources Act licensing regime does not cover the emission
of pollutants into watercourses; the issuing of Pollution Control Certificates falls within the remit of the Ministry of Population and Environment (MOPE). 4
For the purposes of the current study, it appears that since "irrigation of one's own land on an individual or collective basis" is exempt
from the licensing regime,5 WUAs would not need a licence because
their actions qualify as irrigation on a collective basis."0
1. Licensing
The District Water Resources Committee (DWRC) is the body
charged with the task of issuing water utilisation licences. The WRR
established the DWRC as the "prescribed committee" for the purposes
of the Water Resources Act." However, despite being only indirectly
relevant to irrigation management as a result of the exemption noted
above the theoretical licensing process will be outlined in order that
possible improvements may be suggested. The licensing of other uses
of water resources in the wider basin or watershed context may have an
impact on the resources available to WUAs and on the way that these
organisations are managed.
The WRR sets out the licensing process in detail, beginning with
the composition of the DWRC. The DWRC is made up of nine members representative of various bodies and interests concerned with water utilisation."8 This body is not responsible for issuing hydropower
licences, but rather, the Ministry of Water Resources has the sole capacity for hydropower licences.' The WRR establishes the procedural
Electricity Act § 3. Nepal's hydropower policy reiterates this regulatory structure, stating that such licenses as are necessary for hydropower projects must be sought from
the Ministry of Water Resources, rather than the Water Resources Committee. See
Hydro-power Development Policy § 4(a)(l)-(2). The Electricity Act does not define a
licensing authority but presumably regulations, made under that Act, enumerate the
licensing authority. The author was unable to access these regulations. See also Water
Resources Act § 9(1) (noting the generation of hydro-electricity is governed by the
prevailing laws).
24. See infta Part III.A.1. (discussing pollution control and environmental protection).
25. Water Resources Act § 4(2) (b).
26. See id. § 5 (1) (stating collective benefits may be realized by establishing a WUA).
27. Water Resources Regulation R. 8 (1); Water Resources Act § 8(2).
28. Water Resources Regulation R. 8(2) (listing the membership of the DWRC,
which includes the Chief District Officer, the Local Development Officer, and Representatives of: the District Agriculture Development Office, District Forest Office, District Drinking Water Office, District Irrigation Office, District Development Commit-

tee, any electricity project run by His Majesty's Government in the district, and any
other office in the area concerned with water utilisation). The membership of the
DWRC may be above or below nine, depending on which offices are in the district.
29. See Hydro-power Development Policy § 4(a) (2).
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requirements for the meetings of the DWRC, and sets out requirements with respect to licence submission and assessment, renewal, and
No perpetual licences for hydropower exist since
fees chargeable."0
the EA limits the duration of hydropower licences to fifty years.' However, no other legislation mentions restricting the duration of any
other licences that might be issued if the exemptions under Section 4
of the Water Resources Act were ever amended." Section 21 of the
Water Resources Act allows the cancellation of licences when the licensee has not complied with the Act or its subsequent regulations. "
Again, the WRR vests the DWRC with this power.' Under the Water
Resources Act, the DWRC is obligated, in general, to follow a particular
order of priorities in allocating water utilisation licences:
(a) Drinking water and domestic uses;
(b) Irrigation;
(c) Agricultural [u]ses such as animal husbandry and fisheries;
(d)

Hydroelectricity;

(e) Cottage [industry, industrial enterprises and mining uses[;]
(f) Navigation;
(g) Recreational uses;

30. Water Resources Regulation R. 9-26.
31.
Electricity Act § 5(2).
32. Unless the licensing regime provides allows review and revision of allocations,
perpetual licences may be seen as being inimical to good water resources management
as they do not allow for water rights to be adjusted to take account of different circumstances. The water rights allocation mechanisms must be flexible enough to allow for
government review of the uses of a particular watercourse, while giving adequate protection and stability to the holders of those rights. For an international example, consider the position of South Africa, permitting a maximum duration of forty years for
1998,
Act 36
of
Water
of National
§
28(1)(e)
licenses.
water
http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Legislature/nw-act/NWA.pdf (last visited May 1,
2005). South Africa's agencies review licenses at intervals not exceeding five years, and
the responsible authority may change the terms of the license for various circumstances. Id § 28(1)(f), 49(2). The responsible authority may alter the license if the
other licenses for the same water course have been amended in an equitable manner
Id. § 49(3). However, the responsible authority
through a general review process.
may not alter the duration of a license. Id. § 49(2).
33. Water Resources Act § 21(1). Regulations promulgated under the Act include
the WRR and the Irrigation Regulations.
34. Water Resources Regulation, R. 36.
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Other uses."

No indication is given however with respect to application of these
priorities: the implication is that the list indicates the relative ranking
of each use, and therefore the degree of protection that each enjoys
when the DWRC is assessing licence applications. It is not clear if existing low-priority uses would be vulnerable if an application for a higher
ranked use were to be considered by the DWRC in the context of an
already fully utilised watercourse. It should be pointed out, however,
that existing uses appear to be protected to the extent that "[a] person
or a corporate body making use water resources shall make its beneficial use
without causingdamage to other" uses." The interaction between the protection of existing uses and the water use priority list above is not
elaborated upon and the concept of beneficial uses is flimsy in the Water Resources Act." As regards the considerations to be considered by
the DOI in allocating water, there is no indication as to the level of
importance that will be attached to each of the factors.
2. Allocation in the context of WUAs
The practicalities of the situation with respect to the allocation of
water resources become more complicated when the terms of the Irrigation Regulations 2056 ("IR") are considered. A distinction must be
made between the licensing authority identified in the WRA/WRR (i.e.
the DWRC) and the authority responsible for distribution of the water
itself. In the Irrigation Regulations, the body responsible for distributing water to irrigation systems is either the local office of the DOI, in
Water Resources Act § 7(1) (a)-(h). The Act also states that:
If a dispute arises while utilizing water resources, the prescribed committee
shall, on the basis of priority order as set out in sub-section (1), the beneficial
use or misuse made of the water resources in accordance with sub-section (3)
of Section 4 [obligation to make beneficial use without damaging other users] and also by conducting other necessary enquiries, decide as to whether
or not or in what manner such use could be made.
Id. § 7(2). Regarding the link between priorities and licensing, the Act states:
On receipt of an application pursuant to sub-section (1), the prescribed officer or authority shall conduct or cause to conduct necessary enquiries and issue a license to the applicant by prescribing necessary terms according to the
format as prescribed within 30 days of the receipt of such application in the
case of [a] license for conducting [a] survey of water resources and within
120 days in the case of [a] license for the utilization of water resources in accordance with the priority order as set out in sub-section (1) of Section 7.
Id. § 8(2).
36. Water Resources Act, § 4(3).
37. It may be that the translation of section 4(3) is incomplete, and that the words
"beneficial uses" should appear at the end of the provision. Ifthis is the case, existing
beneficial uses would have greater importance than is currently apparent. As the clause
stands, however, all potential existing uses are nominally protected, although this appears to be subject to the water use priority list.
35.
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situations where the government remains in control of a system, or the
relevant WUA where management has been transferred.' In order to
establish the priorities for provision of water, the service provider (or
"Project Office" as it is referred to in the IR), in conjunction with the
District Agriculture Development Office and relevant WUAs, 5 must
take the following considerations into account:
(a) Geographical location of the concerned area
(b)Area of land
(c) The quantity of water available at the source
(d)

Type of crop to be cultivated no [sic] the land

(e) Nature of soil of the land
(f) The capacity of the structure and other technical matter'
The allocation of water to watercourses by Project Offices is based
only on the factors in IR rule 21, although, again, no assistance is provided which illuminates the way in which these criteria should be applied in practice. In addition, when considering how water should be
distributed, it is not possible for Project Offices to guarantee that they
are in possession of the all relevant information regarding a particular
watercourse. This is especially true with respect to the availability of
the resource, because additional licences may already have been allocated by other responsible authorities for that water, whether in the
same District or not. This raises the broader issue of how an effective
licensing regime can be possible in circumstance where licences may
be issued by a number of separate and independent bodies, each responsible to different ministries. None of these bodies operate on a
catchment basis and none of them control all the water uses within
their respective areas. Ideally, there would be only one licensing

38. The licence holder, where one has been issued, may also be considered to be a
service provider, but the regulations do not provide further detail regarding what
situations may be covered by this. It appears simply to be a reference back to the abortive licensing regime of the Water Resources Act, although licence holders under that
Act would still be WUAs. As shall be seen below, the Water Resources Act requires that
WUAs be licensed, but the Irrigation Regulations merely require that they be registered.
39. Irrigation Regulation R. 21(1). Prior to the introduction of the most recent
version of the Irrigation Regulations in February 2004, WUAs had no right to be consulted in this process.
40. Id. R. 21 (l)-(2). Prior to the February 2004 amendments to the Irrigation
Regulation, no right for consultation with the WUAs existed in this process.
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agency controlling all water use in a particular catchment," and this
must be the recommendation in Nepal for the longer term.
In addition, the entities responsible for licensing and registration
are constituted on the basis of political (i.e. District) boundaries rather
than hydrological ones. There are no provisions ensuring information
transfer between districts as regards inter-district watercourses, and the
result of this is that in the event of the licensing regime being put into
effect, conflicting licences could be issued for the same watercourse,
with consequent impacts on downstream water quality and quantity.
This is compounded by the fact that an individual watercourse may be
affected by licences issued by the relevant DWRCs and also by the pollution control licensing of the MOPE. Shrestha cites the problems
encountered in one example where a downstream WUA was significantly affected by the establishment of a fish farm upstream."
The advantage derived from bringing irrigation activities within the
licensing regime as a whole is that this would allow the DOI and the
DWRCs to exercise a degree of control over one of the major uses of
water in Nepal. Currently, the Project Office must take account of the
availability of water at the source. 3 Without information detailing the
level of water use on a watercourse, it will not be possible for the Project Office to do this with any degree of accuracy. A comprehensive
licensing regime would increase the authorities' understanding of the
way in which a canal is used and, in cases where no transfer agreement
is in place between the government and a WUA, should provide an
enforceable right that can be relied upon by licence-holders."
The licensing of WUAs in the context of subsistence farming raises
a number of problems, however, especially where the WUA is part of a
broader irrigation system. In such cases, the identity of both licensor
and licensee becomes an issue, as does the necessity for having a single
body in charge of all water uses. Where the WUA is part of a much
larger irrigation system, the Project Office for that system will normally
be part of the DOI, although it may also be a private operator. 5 The
As is the case, for example, in South Africa and in parts of Australia.
Ava Shrestha, Building Gender-Responsive Water User Associations in Nepal, in
BRINGING WATER TO THE POOR: SELECTED ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK CASE STUDIEs 14, 1718 (Mary Ann Asico & Lisa Lumbao eds., 2004).
43. See Water Resources Act § 21 (1).
44. See also M. Svendsen & G. Nott, Irrigation Management and Transfer in Turkey:
Process and Outcomes, in CASE STUDIES IN PARTICIPATORY IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT 55 (D.
Groenfeldt & M. Svendsen eds., 2000), available at www.inpim.org. Securing enforceable water rights was regarded as essential if the organisations set up in Turkey were to
be sustainable.
45. See Irrigation Regulation R. 43A-B (addressing the potential for transfer of
operation and maintenance responsibilities to private concerns:
43A. To be operated on lease:
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this regulation, Department may
lease out the responsibility of maintenance and operation as whole or in a
41.
42.
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party withdrawing water from the original watercourse, and consequently the entity that would be licensed in the South African context,
is the DOI. A general requirement for WUAs to be licensed would
cause problems for such organisations operating within these larger
projects, as the control of water use would be the responsibility of the
Project Office. The WUA would be taking water from the canal system
controlled by the Project Office, but would be licensed by the body
responsible for the watercourse as a whole. This separation of the responsibilities for licensing and management would have the effect of
either taking control away from the Project Office or rendering worthless the licence itself.'
Notwithstanding the provisions detailed above regarding the licensing of water use and allocation of resources, the government retains
the capacity to issue unchallengeable directives regarding water use."
With respect to the criteria to be taken into consideration by the
Project Office when distributing water, questions may be raised as to
whether or not the list is comprehensive enough to meet the objectives
of the Nepali government. For example, the Branch Committee of the
Bijayapur WUA is bound by its constitutive documents to distribute
water according to equity.'8 This is a concept that the Project Office is
currently not obliged to take into account. While equity is a difficult
standard to measure, it may be that by adding it as one of the criteria
to be used by the Project Office in distributing water, members will
partial manner on the basis of competition to a person Users' Association or
Non Governmental Organisation of the canal, secondary canal, sub secondary
canal and water course under the system operated by His Majesty's Government or conducted in under the joint Management system.
(2) The notice of at least 35 days shall be published in the national daily
newspaper for the lease pursuant to sub rule (1) and other procedure shall
be as mentioned on Directives.
43B. Management may be transferred:
(1) The regular management responsibility as carried out by His Majesty's
Government on large and medium irrigation system constructed by His Majesty's Government and presently managed under joint management system
shall be transferred to the local bodies on the basis of demand, technical capacity and availability of resources of the local bodies.
46. In South Africa, difficulties have been encountered with respect to the licensing
of WUAs formed from groups of subsistence farmers. Individual subsistence farmers do
not appear to need a licence, but this acts as a disincentive for farmers to form WUAs,
as this makes administrative and economic demands that farmers cannot afford or do
not wish to make. This in turn may result in lack of water for downstream WUAs due to
the cumulative effect of large numbers of unlicensed subsistence farmers upstream. See
Chancellor F. Upton, M. Shepherd & D. Shepherd, KaR Project R7810 Final Report:
Revitalisation and Transfer of Smallholder Irrigation schemes to Farmer Managers, and the
Establishment of Water UserAssociations (on file with author).
47. Water Resources Regulation R. 39; Irrigation Regulation R. 41.
48. Water Users' Institution 2058, Lekhnath Municipality, Bijayapur Irrigation
System, Constitution, para. 15(h) (n.d.) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bijayapur
Irrigation System Constitution].
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gain some degree of protection. It may also encourage other WUAs to
include equity as a governing principle in their own constitutive
documents."
3. Allocation in Times of Shortage
It is the responsibility of the Project Office,' as water distributor, to
decide how to allocate water in the event of a shortage," In making
these decisions, the Project Office must take into account the six usage
priorities listed in the Irrigation Regulations, and must "consult with
the concerned Irrigation Office... and the concerned local body."52
Presumably, the local body is as defined in the Local Self-Governance
The Project Office must also "coordinate" with the efAct (LSGA).
fected WUA before deciding how to allocate water. 4 The wording of
the provision implies the Project Office need not actually consult with
the WUA, but must inform the WUA in advance. The Irrigation Regu49. This, of course, will only be of use if members have the capacity and means of
enforcing this standard. See id. para. 3.1. It may also be noted in the context of the
Andhra Pradesh reforms, that while the Farmers' Management of Irrigation Systems
Act 1997 acknowledges that the state depends upon "efficient and equitable supply and
distribution of water," there is no explicit requirement for the WUA to create an equitable
system.
Equity underlies the entire water use management system in South Africa, with
duties being placed on the relevant Minister, equity being the driving factor behind
the licensing strategy and in the reviewing of licenses. In Kyrgyzstan, WUA members
have the right to receive a" fair and equitable" share of the water distributed in the
irrigated area. See Law on Unions of Water Users, art.9 (n.d.) (on file with author). See
also HODGSON, LEGISLATION ON WATER USERS' ORGANISATION 48 (FAO Legislative Study
79, Rome 2003).
50. The Project Office is the DOI in the case of agency and joint-managed projects,
and the WUA in the case of Users' Association managed projects. Irrigation Regulation R. 2(k).
51. Id. R.22.
52. Id. R. 22(2).
53. The LSGA defines a "Local Body" as "the Village Development Committee,
Municipality and District Development Committee." Local Self-Governance Act, 2055
(Nepal),
(1999)
2(a)
§
http://www.undp.org/governance/marrakechcdrom/concepts/HMG%20Nepal%20%20Local%2OSelf%20Governance%2OAct.pdf (last visited May 1, 2005) [hereinafter
Local Self-Governance Act].
54. The Irrigation Regulation states:
(1) On the circumstances that due to the demand for water exceeding the
availability of water at the source or the capacity of Structure, the Service
could not be supplied in accordance with demand, the Project Office upon
coordination of Users' Association may decide to reduce the service partially
subject to the order as specified in Rule 21.
(2) While making decision pursuant sub-rule (1), the Project Office shall be
required to consult with the concerned Irrigation Office and the concerned
local body.
Irrigation Regulation R. 22, (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file with author).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 8

lation is silent on the subject of dispute resolution; no appeal appears
to be available to challenge the decisions of the Project Office in such
circumstances. Joint-managed projects may allocate specific roles to
the managing partners in such circumstances, but one must consult
the relevant transfer document and WUA constitutive documents for
the details of such roles.5 In the case of the Sunsari Morang Irrigation
Project, no provision relating to the allocation of water in times of
shortage is evident: the Water Users Committee is responsible for setting rotational schedules, but need only involve water users and keep
them informed. 6
Where the WUA itself is the Project Office, it must take account of
the usage considerations, but will have to do so using only the water
that it receives from the DOI, which again is obliged to make use of the
same priorities. In the Bijayapur system, one of the objectives of the
WUA is to prepare rules regarding the use of water in times of shortage,57 but these are unavailable, if they exist at all. As noted above,
however, in the absence of such rules, the Branch Committee is by default obliged to distribute water according to equity."
4. Allocation of Water Resources to New Users
The introduction of new users to irrigation systems raises issues related to the adequacy of the resource (and assessment thereof), the
criteria applied to applications, consultation requirements and the
degree to which existing rights to water use are protected. A distinction is made in the legislation between applications to join an existing
project and applications for water utilisation licences: the former are
made to the relevant WUA or Project Office, and the latter to the
DWRC.

55.

For example, one such document states: "WUC is fully responsible to manage

rotational practice between users of canal command area to best utilize limited water
in agriculture by informing all users about rotational schedule of the canal operation
through involvement of water users groups in whole command area." The Agreement
of Hand Over to Water Users Committee For Operation and Management of SS9E

Sub-Secondary Canal in Sitagunj Secondary Canal of Sunsari Morang Irrigation Project, para.(b) (v) (n.d.) (on file with author). See also Bijayapur Irrigation System Constitution, para.4(f) (stating that the obligations of the institution include making "rules
and regulations to use the water in case insufficient water in the canal").

56. See Agreement of Hand Over to Water Users Committee For Operation and
Management of SS9E Sub-secondary Canal in Sitagunj Secondary canal of Sunsari
Morang Irrigation Project para. (b) (v) (n.d.) (on file with author) (stating "WUC is
fully responsible to manage rotational practice between users of canal command area
to best utilize limited water in agriculture by informing all users about rotational

schedule of the canal operation through involvement of water users groups in whole
command area").
57. Bijayapur Irrigation System Constitution, para.4(f).
58. See supra note 45.
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a. New Users Applying to an ExistingSystem
Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in practice, the Nepali government applies the proper procedure for the introduction of new users
to a system to varying degrees. The IR sets out the procedure in Rule
18, providing:
1. A person desirous of enjoying the Service of Project developed
and operated by His Majesty's Government or a project transferred to
Users' Association after being developed by His Majesty's Government
shall be required to submit an application to the concerned Project
Office.
2. Upon receipt of the application pursuant to sub-rule (1) the Project Office shall deliver the Service after making an inquiry on the
technical and other necessary details as to whether the Service can be
provided or not. If the Service cannot be delivered, the applicant
shall be notified accordingly. 9
The wording above limits the application process to those WUAs that
possess operational control following government development.
Therefore, the application process in the IR does not apply to WUAs'
controlling systems that HMG did not originally develop.
The Project Office may attach licensing conditions consistent with
the provisions of the 1R to the use of the water resources.' The implication taken by the author during a visit to a farmer-managed irrigation system was that the circumstances would be different in every case
of a prospective new use, depending on the number of current users,
current water usage and local hierarchies, and other factors.
Rule 18 of the Irrigation Regulations states that new applicants will
receive service provided to them unless the required inquiries the Project Office undertakes reveal service "cannot be delivered.""1 Additionally, Rule 5(1) (d) of the same regulations, in setting out the duties of
the WUAs, includes the requirement "[tlo distribute water to new User
causing any harm to the previous Users who are receivfarmers without ""
ing the Service.
This requirement complies with Rule 18 insofar as
the WUAs responsibility is to protect existing users and to admit new
users if resources allow. The relevant WUA's constitution may also
significantly bear on the restrictions for new membership.

59.

Irrigation Regulation R. 18 (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file

with author).
60.

Id. R. 20.

61.

Id. R. 18(2).

62.

ld. R. 5(1)(d).
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b. New Projects
For entirely new projects, Section 17 of the WRR appears to demand applicants submit an application in the form provided to the
DWRC." The WRR does not explicitly apply only to new projects, but
to those persons who desire "to obtain a licence for utilisation of water
resources."'
However, the language in those sections detailing the
application requirements' strongly suggests applications are for new
projects. While this is not directly relevant to WUAsj it has a direct
bearing on the way that new users are incorporated into water systems,
and therefore has the potential to have a significant impact on the
availability of water to WUAs.
All of the above-mentioned legislation regarding new users fails to
set out criteria against which the relevant authority may evaluate a new
application. Rules 18 and 19 of the WRR only require the licensing
authority to confirm the applicant submitted the relevant documentation," giving public notice of the application, and that the licensing
authority took into account the objections received related to public
concern over adverse effects.'
This evaluation process has two main effects. First, the evaluation
of applications by the DWRC could be more difficult since the licensing authority contains no objective method for determining whether
or not an application is reasonable. Second, the lack of objective standards obfuscated the process of evaluation and is characterised by a
general lack of transparency. Furthermore, since there is no requirement to publish details of any objections received, there is no way of
ascertaining if any conditions attached to a licence match the adverse
impacts alleged. As a result, it is not possible to objectively determine
if the licensing authority considered all of the objections it received.
In issuing a licence, the licensing authority is not required to assess
the quantity or quality of water available, although the applicant must
provide some information concerning environmental effects in the
initial application. 9 The licensing authority is required to take account
of the priorities listed in Section 7 of the Water Resources Act in making its decision, 7 but uncertainties regarding practical application of
63.

Water Resources Regulation R. 17(1) (1993) (Nepal).

64.

Id.

65.

See id. R. 17(1)(a)-(f).

66.
67.

Due to the fact that irrigation is not a licensable activity.
Id. R. 18.

68.

Id. R. 19.

69. The wording of the WRR is broader than simply providing environmental information. The provision also includes details of social and economic impacts, and
alleviatory measures taken to reduce adverse effects. Id. R. 17(e).
70. The WRR does not mention these priorities with respect to the licensing procedure. See infra note 35.
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these priorities render the process open to broad interpretation.
Moreover, the licensing authority need not consider other uses of an
inter-district watercourse in other districts. Instead of assessing water
availability during licensing, any usage rights endowed by the licence
are subject "to the extent of water resources of such place and area as
specified" in the particular licence.7' Therefore, the licence holders
and users must allocate available resources if the licensing authority
issues water usage licences beyond a watercourse's capacity or in time
of drought."
It should also be noted that applications for larger irrigation
schemes may require environmental impact assessments. Part III.A.I.,
below, covers the details of this process.
5. Registration of Water User Associations
To complete the discussion of the allocation of water resources, the
separate issue of WUAs' registration must be addressed. As indicated
above, the IR demands that WUAs register themselves. 3 Rule 3 of the
IR states: "[t]he following users of irrigation system constitute an users
association ... and submit an application to the concerned Irrigation
office in the format as prescribed in Schedule -1: Developed and operated by His Majesty's Government; Maintained and rehabilitated by His
Majesty's Government; Constructed and operated by the farmer
groups.""4
The WUA is therefore required to register with the local DOI office
before beginning to use water resources.7 ' There is no centralised database of registered WUAs and each district office retains only its own
records. More fundamentally, there is no basin-wide register of water
rights for particular watercourses. Since the districts are based on administrative rather than basin boundaries, this further creates difficulties and unwieldiness in the administration of disputes between
neighbouring districts. These difficulties decrease the effectiveness of
any integrated water resource management practice.
Prior to the introduction of the water resources legislation, water
use organisations registered with the Local Development Office (LDO)

71.
Water Resources Regulation R. 22.
72. See supra Part II.B.2. (providing further detail regarding the water allocation
procedures followed in times of shortage).
73. Irrigation Regulation R. 3 (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file with
author).
74. Irrigation Regulation sched. 1.
75. See id. (enumerating the requirements of the form submitted to the DOI). Registration is also required in other countries, notably: Armenia (see Law on Water User
Associations and Unions of Water User Associations, art.8, on file with author); and
Kyrgyzstan (see Law on Unions of Water Users, art.5, on file with author). It has not
been possible to confirm what the renewal requirements in these nations are, if any.
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under the auspices of the Association Registration Act.76 Following the
passage of the Water Resources Act, at least initially, WUAs erroneously
registered with the LDO, largely due to a lack of knowledge on the part
of local officials, and, possibly, political manoeuvring at the local
level." Until recently, registration was permanent, although the former practice of registering with the Chief District Officer required annual renewal. With the advent of the changes to the Irrigation Regulations, however, WUAs must now renew their registration annually."
Such a renewal process will be a valuable tool for performance monitoring and general monitoring purposes, although the frequency of
renewal is arguable. This is especially true in an environment where
licensing of collective irrigation does not take place.
Registration results in a number of important consequences for
WUAs. First, a properly registered WUA will become "an autonomous
and corporate body having perpetual succession," and will "have the
right to acquire, enjoy, sell, dispose or arrange by any means of movable and immovable property.'" Secondly, WUAs are capable of suing
and being sued."0 WUAs, therefore, possess the authority to take legal
action against other users who misuse water resources.
In addition, it should not be possible for unregistered WUAs to
make use of water resources from government-run schemes. In practice, however, the DOI can point to no powers that allow it to take action against any such transgressing WUAs. It is also the case that WUAs
will not have access to government funds if they are not registered.
Information regarding unregistered WUAs is not available, and it is
therefore not possible to determine whether or not this is an issue of
concern at present. As regards the consequences for a WUA of nonrenewal of registration, the legislation says nothing. If a WUA is no
76. Association Registration Act, 2034 BS (1977) (Nepal).
77. There may be local tension between the resource demands of the DOI and the
LDO. Additionally, the LDO may wish to continue receiving any revenue related to
registration, or there may be conflicts regarding status and influence.
78. The Irrigation Regulations states:
(1) Every users association, registered as per this Regulation, shall submit an
application to the concerned Irrigation Office along with audit report as audited by recognised auditor from the Auditor General's Department and annual report for the renewal within the ninety days of fiscal year.
(2) If it is not possible to produce an application due to some reason within
the time frame pursuant to sub rule (1) an application with reasons shall be
submitted within additional ninety days for renewal including Rs. 100 [sic] as
late fee
(3) Upon receiving an application pursuant to sub rule (1) and (2) Concerned Irrigation Office shall renew within seven days. Written information
shall be given to the concerned user's association if there is any reason for not
to renew it.

Irrigation Regulation R. 8.
79. Water Resources Act § 6(1), (3) (1992) (Nepal).
80. Id. §6(4).
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longer registered, it would in theory lose its legal status, which would
cause many problems, not least for those seeking to recover debts from
them. It could no longer be sued as a separate legal entity and there is
nothing in the WUA legislation to indicate that the individual members of the WUA could be sued for those debts. Members of the WUA
would also be unable to take action against other persons and there
may be consequences with respect to its ability to use its bank account.8' It might be better if withdrawal of registration was used only as
a means of enforcing compliance where all other measures have failed.
A presumption could be introduced such that registered WUAs will
continue to operate, unless they repeatedly fail to produce relevant
documentation and / or comply with the requirements of the legislation.
IH. RESTRICTIONS ON USE
A.LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

The system of unlicensed water utilisation the Water Resources Act
and subsequent regulations created both defacto and, in effect, dejure is
subject to a number of legislative restrictions to protect other users and
the environment. Nepal protects other users and the environment
through pollution control legislation, the enforcement of which falls
outside the remit of the Ministry of Water Resources and the DOI.
Similar to the situation of the Water Resources Act licensing system,
however, the intention behind the restrictions is nobler than the reality
due to the complete lack of a monitoring network in Nepal.
The Irrigation Policy seeks to address this to some extent; it recognises, for example, that irrigation projects should have minimal adverse environmental effects and that irrigation should leave such quantity of water as will not detrimentally effect biodiversity." The Nepali
government imposed no timescale on this objective, although they direct that the policy is due to be updated after five years."

81. In the Bijayapur context, the constitution states that if the institution "collapses", the assets of the WUA will revert to the government of Nepal. See Bijayapur
Irrigation System Constitution, para.31. However, legal incapacity is not synonymous
with "collapse", so it is not at all certain that this provision would be triggered by the
lack of registration. The position is the same in Kamala Uttarbahini. See Kamala Uttarbahini Canal Project: Constitution of the Water Users' Working Committee, Bandipur,
Siraha, 2059, para.28 (n.d.) (on file with author).
82. See
Irrigation
Policy
§§
2.11.1,
2.11.3
(Nepal),
http://www.doi.gov.np/irrigation-policy.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2005).
83. Id. § 2.15.8.
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1. General Pollution Control and Environmental Protection
The government has the power to publish enforceable water quality standards for particular uses, but it has not yet set these standards."
Although Nepal has not yet formulated water quality standards, it has
established some emission limits. Primary responsibility for pollution
control lies with the MOPE, which implements the Environment ProThe EPR states,
tection Act, 2053 and its subsequent regulations."
"[n]o person shall emit or cause the emission of noise, heat, radioactive [sic] material and waste from any mechanical means, industrial
establishment or any other place in contravention of the standards
prescribed by the Ministry by notification published in the Gazette." 6
General and industry-specific tolerance limits have been set with
respect to certain substances, 7 but the level of enforcement seems to
be erratic' - from the list of fifty-five industries indicated in Sch.7 of the
Environment Protection Rules, it appears that ELVs have been set for
only nine.'
Those affected by pollution incidents are entitled to compensation
for loss suffered.' Additional anti-pollution provisions are contained
in the WRA:
1) His Majesty's Government may, by a notification published in the
Nepal Gazette, prescribe the pollution tolerance limit for water resources.
2) No one shall pollute water resource [s] by way of using or putting
any litter, industrial wastes, poison, chemical or toxicant to the effect
that the pollution tolerance limit of the water resource[s] as prescribed pursuant to sub-section (1) is exceeded.
84. Water Resources Act § 18.
I
(Nepal),
ch.
Rules
Protection
85. Environment
http://www.mope.gov.np/environment/rule97.php (last visited May 1, 2005).
86. Id. ch. 3.
87. The MOPE website provides further details of these limits. A list of industries
requiring Pollution Control Certificates, which are required by Environment Protection Rule 16 of the EPR, may be found in schedule 7 of the Environment Protection
Rules, available at http://www.mope.gov.np/environment/rule9 7 .php. Provisional
Certificates must be renewed every year and Permanent Certificates (those relating to
industries for which emission standards have been published) every three years. See
Environment Protection Rules R.16. It has not been possible to verify the degree to
which these requirements are followed in practice.

88. E-mail from Andrew Allan, author, to Basistha Raj Adhikari, Department of
Irrigation (on file with author).
89.

See MOPE, available at http://www.mope.gov.np/environment/industry.php

(listing the details of the industries for which effluent standards have been established).
90. See Environment Protection Rules ch. 3, 8. Nepali courts are currently dealing
with a number of compensation actions, but the author understands that the government has not yet prosecuted under the Act.
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3) The prescribed officer may, as required, examine or cause to examine to determine as to whether or not the water resource has been
polluted or the quality standard as prescribed pursuant to sub-section
(1) of Section 18 has been maintained.91
Further, with the broader aim of preventing harm to the environment
in general, the Government mandates "[w] hile utilizing water resources, it shall be done so in such a manner that no substantial adverse effect be made on [the] environment by way of soil erosion,
flood, landslide or [any] other [similar] cause. ""
Again, the Nepal government has not yet determined these pollution tolerance limits, making the likelihood of successful actions
against polluters remote. Since neither those discharging chemicals
nor government agencies measure emissions of potentially polluting
materials, any legal actions presumably face significant difficulties with
respect to proving causation. Environmental assessments must be undertaken with respect to certain types of project." A distinction is made
between projects requiring Initial Environmental Examinations (LEEs)
and the large-scale projects that require the more onerous Environmental Impact Assessments (ELAs).
Unfortunately, it has not been
possible to obtain data from the MOPE regarding the degree to which
this legislation is enforced and complied with following project implementation. In general, environmental assessments are necessary only
for larger projects.' Although it is beyond the scope of this report to
comment on the levels at which such assessments are required and the
industries that are affected, it may be useful to indicate the extent to
which a WUA may be involved in the environmental assessment processes. If we take as an example a proposal to develop a new drinking
water supply, the level of environmental assessment required will be
governed by Schedules 1 and 2 of the Environmental Protection
Rules.'
Proponents of new projects requiring environmental assess91. Water Resources Act § 19 (1992) (Nepal).
92. Id. § 20.
93. Environment Protection Act § 3, 5. Approval of a project may be given under
section 6.
94. For further details regarding the processes to be followed with respect to environmental assessments, see Environment Protection Rules, rules 3-14 and Schedules 1,
3 and 5 (with respect to Initial Environmental Examinations) and 2, 4 and 6 (with
respect to Environmental Impact Assessments).
95. The rehabilitation of irrigation systems do not require EIAs, but may require
IEEs depending on their size and location. The scale of assessment needed for new
schemes will also vary according to size and location, but ELAs may be necessary. Full
ELAs will also have to be completed for any project, irrespective of magnitude, if, for
example, the affected area contains a main source of public water or is semi-arid or
mountainous. Environment Protection Rules, sch.2.
96. Schedules I and 2 set out the criteria which will govern whether an IEE or an
E1A are required. For example, the criteria with respect to water resources projects are
as follows:
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ments must inform a number of specified local bodies about such proposals to seek their views on the environmental impact of the project.
Such consultations take place during the scoping of the project and
during the preparation period of the LEE or EIA."7 WUAs are not specified organisations in either case, although they may give their views.
The body responsible for authorising such projects, for example, the
Ministry of Population and Environment, must take account of the
representations made by those who responded to the consultations and
may give approval to the project if no substantialnegative or adverse
impact on the environment will result. 8 There is no duty placed on
the approving body to consult with any other authority or any individual groups or organisations. Schedules 5 and 6 of the EPR set out the
information that must be submitted to the approving body, which includes details of the impact on land use and the degradation of cultivable land. The rules, unfortunately, do not contain any indications as
to the importance attached to the information provided in these applications, and it is therefore not possible to assess the priority attached to
the damage caused to irrigated land by any resultant shortages of water.
The Environment Protection Act distinguishes between the regulation of emissions and that of water quality, making different ministries

Impact
Assessment
Examination
Environmental
Initial
Environmental
(Sch.2)
(Sch.1)
New irrigation systems:
New irrigation systems:
- Those irrigatingmore than 2000 hectares in
- Those irrigating25 to 2000 hectares in the
the Tarai.
Taraikilometre
-Those irrigating15 to 500 hectares in the hill -Those irrigatingmore than 500 hectares in the
hill valleys.
valleys."
-Those irrigating10 to 200 hectares in the hill -Those irrigationmore the 200 hectares in the
hill and mountain areas with a steep gradient.
and mountain areas with a steep gradient.
-Any water resources development activity
Rehabilitated irrigation systems:
which displaces more than 100 people with
- Those irrigatingmore than 500 hectares in the
permanent residence.
Tarai.
Additionally, any projects that are pro- Those irrigatingmore than 200 hectares is the
posed in certain areas, including the
hill valleys.
following:
-Those irrigatingmore than 100 hectares in the
-Historical,culturaland archaeologicalsites
hill and mountain areas with a steep gradient.
-Environmentally "weak and wet"areas
-Any water resources development activity
which displaces from 25 to 100 persons with -Nationalparks
-Semi-arid, mountainous and Himalayan
permanent residence
areas
-Flood prone areas
-Areas with main sources of public water supply.
97.
98.

See Environment Protection Rules R. 4, 7.
Environment Protection Rules R. 9.
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responsible for each. Best practice in the European Union and in
South Africa regulates emissions, whether point source or diffuse, according to the capacity of the receiving waters.' Nepal does not follow
this practice despite some efforts to implement this methodology in
the above legislation. The author's impression, taken from discussions
with employees of the DOI and FMIS officials, is that problems associated with pollution were of less concern to WUAs outside the Kathmandu Valley. Apparently, these WUAs are more concerned with the
lack of water, although as Nepal industrialises, water quality will become more important. In addition, there is currently no provision
compelling the DOI to consult on any matter with the MOPE. Communications between the author and representatives of the DOI suggest that lines of communication between employees of the two ministries may be ill-defined.
Along with the DOI and the MOPE, both Village Development
Committees (VDCs) and municipalities are assigned roles with regard
to pollution control, although, again, the extent of their involvement is
uncertain.'" Under the LSGA, VDCs have a general obligation to formulate plans for environmental protection, and, more specifically, to
prevent pollution in areas used for tourism.' However, municipalities
have a duty to control water pollution generated within their respective
areas. Part 3 of the LSGA designates these municipal areas, and, although they imply some degree of urban development, they may also
include hill areas, which have developed to a certain degree."2 The
allocation of responsibilities between the MOPE and these local bodies
is uncertain under the current legislation.
2. Protection of Other Users
The Water Resources Act contains a number of provisions that seek
to limit the damage caused by pollution or abuse of water resources.

99. See, e.g., Council Directive 2000/60/EC of 23 October 2000 Establishing A
Framework for Community Action in the Field of Water Policy, 2000 O.J. (L 327) 40,
http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/i327/_32720001222enOO010072.pdf (last visited May 1,
2005); DEP'T WATER AFFAnts & FORESTRY, REPUBLIC OF SouTH AFRICA, NATIONAL WATER
56
(2004),
STRATEGY
RESOURCE
http://www.dwaf.pwv.gov.za/Documents/Policies/NWRS/Sep2004/pdf/General.pdf
(last visited May 1, 2005) (noting the dual system of "Resource-Directed Measures" and
"Source- Directed Controls").
(Nepal),
Act
§§
28,
96
(1999)
100. Local
Self-Governance
http://www.undp.org/governance/marrakechcdrom/concepts/HMG%20Nepal%20%20Local%2OSelf%2oGovernance%2OAct.pdf (last visited May 1, 2005).
101. Id. § 28(h), (j). The VDC also has enforcement powers with respect to those
who dump solid waste; municipalities have similar powers, but may levy fines 150 times
as large as VDCs. Compare id. § 70(c), (g), witih id. § 165(f).
102. Id. § 72.
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Section 4(3) of the Water Resources Act states that "[a] person or a
corporate body making use of water resources shall make its beneficial
use without causing damage to other[s] ."'°
Compensation may be available to those damaged by another's water use. 1 This compensation may provide a better foundation for antipollution than the Environment Protection Act's provisions. In addition, Section 14 of the Water Resources Act provides that services may
be terminated if a person "is in default of payment of the charge for
the utilisation of services or utilises the services [without proper authorisation] or misuses the services or acts in contravention of the
terms and conditions. '" °0
Water users found to be misusing water resources could have their
service terminated, although the Water Resources Act does not specify
the exact meaning of "misuse." In fact, the Act does not define either
"use" or "misuse," which is not helpful for licensing or avoiding disputes. Nevertheless, the Act provides that "use" must take place without "substantial adverse effect ... on [the] environment by way of soil
erosion, flood, landslide or [an] other [similar] cause," although it
fails to provide measures for enforcement."'
A similar provision appears in the EA, requiring that "[w] hile carrying out electricity generation, transmission or distribution ... no substantial adverse effect be made on [the] environment by way of soil
erosion, flood, landslide, air pollution [,] etc."" 7 The EA also requires
an applicant submit an environmental report to the prescribed officer
before the officer may grant a licence related to electricity generation.10 8 However, there is no corresponding obligation on the prescribed officer to consider such a report in making his or her decision,
and the EA does not set out requirements regarding the preparation
or contents of environmental reports.
04

IV. GOVERNANCE: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE
A. ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
For details on dispute resolution processes and requirements, see
Part IV.E., below.
103. Water Resources Act § 4(3) (1992) (Nepal). The Water Resources Act defines
"beneficial uses" as "rational uses of the water resources within the available means and
resources." Id. § 2(b).
104. The Water Resources Act notes "[tihe prescribed officer may impose a fine up
to an amount of five thousand rupees to any person who acts in contravention of this
Act or rules made under this [A] ct and realize compensation also for such damage
from such person if damage is caused to anybody due to such act." Id. § 22.
105. Id. § 14.
106. Id. § 20.
107. Electricity Act § 24 (1992) (Nepal).

108.

Id. § 4.
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1. Legislation
Under Nepal's water resources legislation, WUAs have limited
powers to financially penalise their members for non-payment of service fees or for unauthorised use of water resources within their respective irrigated areas. WUAs may charge penalty fees with respect to service fees that the users pay late,"° but this relies on the charge the Service Charge Fixation Committee sets. ' To date, Nepal does not appear to have established this committee on a general basis."' Regarding penalties, the wording of Section 14 of the Water Resources Act
appears to allow recipients of service charges to terminate supplies to
members who are "in default of payment of the charge for the utilisaton of services or utilises the services [without proper authorisation]
or misuses the services or acts in contravention of the terms and conditions..' These "recipients of service charges" may include WUAs, but
based on the wording and context of the clause, it appears more likely
that the provision allows the DOI to stop services to WUAs, rather than
enabling WUAs to take action against members." ' The context concerns the rights and obligations of licensees, and, as previously discussed, WIUAs do not fall into this category.
Despite this argument under the Water Resources Act, WUAs and
the DOI do possess power under the IR to suspend water services to
members:
a. If the User has failed to pay Service Charges due,'14

The Irrigation Regulation provides:
If the Service Charge to be paid by the User to the users association or person
or institution entitled to power is not paid within the specified time, the User
shall be required to pay [a] late charge in addition to [the] Service Charge
and the rate of the late charge to be paid by the User shall be as fixed by the
Service Charge Fixation Committee constituted pursuant to Rule 25.
Irrigation Regulation R. 30(1) (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file with
author). Note, however, that the reference to R.25 is incorrect; R.26 is, in fact, the
relevant provision. The recent changes made to the Irrigation Regulations introduced
a new member to the Service Charge Fixation Committee: a representative of the District Irrigation Users' Association. Id. R. 4. This body is referred to elsewhere in the
IR; for example, see R.4 (8) with respect to the dissolution of Executive Committees of
user associations, and R.7 with respect to Users Coordination Associations. The Service Charge Fixation Committee is not further defined though; thus, it is not clear
what its role is or from what source it should draw its members.
110. Id. R. 26.
111. Interview with Basistha Raj Adhikari, Department of Irrigation (on file with
author).
112. Water Resources Act § 14 (1992) (Nepal).
113. If the author's inference is incorrect, it may be that the quality of the translation is complicit.
114. The actual wording of the new Rule 23(a) is not entirely clear, and may be less
broad than the previous version. There is an implication that the provision refers only
109.
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b. If the user violates the conditions of the agreement with the WUA,
c. [W]here the canal structures have been damaged (until necessary
repair and maintenance is complete)." 5
In addition, the revised Rule 5(1) (h) of the IR specifically allows
WUAs to "exclude those users who fail to pay the service charge.""'

Experience indicates that instances of WUAs actually terminating supply are very limited at best."' Where the social cohesion of farmermanaged schemes is missing, WUAs lack the resources or willingness to
police cessation of service, so it is difficult to ensure the enforcement
of such action. The agreement between the WUAs and individual is
memorialized in that WUA's constitution and by laws. Of the three
examples available to the author, 6 8 only one details the obligations of
members (Bijayapur), and its obligations are limited to requiring that
members attend meetings and work in favour of the WUA."9 The by
laws for the same system, however, allow cancellation of membership if
service charges are not paid.'
The constitution of the Sunsari-Morang
system requires one of the committees prevent illegal use of water, but
provides no enforcement powers for it to do so.'
However, in theory, bodies other than WUAs may levy penalties
and compensatory awards are possible in instances where:
* the Water Resources Act or rules made under it have been contravened;
* water has been used beyond the terms of, or in the absence of, a
licence;
*

water has been stolen; or

to the fees the WUA pays to the Irrigation Office. If this narrower reading is indeed
correct, WUAs may still terminate or suspend service under the revised Rule 5(1) (h).
115. Irrigation Regulation R. 23.
116. Id. R. 5(1) (h).
117. Interview with Simon Howarth & Mott MacDonald.
118. Bijayapur Irrigation System Constitution & By Laws, supra note 46; Kamala
Uttarbahini Constitution & By Laws, and Sunsari-Morang Constitution & By Laws
(n.d.) (unofficial English trans. of the official documents, on file with author).
119. Bijayapur Irrigation System Constitution, para. 19(v).
120. Bijayapur Irrigation System By Laws, para. 3.3. Cancellation of membership
may also occur when ownership or tenancy is ended or if membership fees are unpaid.
It is not clear how often such a sanction is imposed, nor is it clear how it is enforced,
given the problems of blocking water supplies. The other consequence of nonmembership of a WUA is the loss of voting rights with respect to committee membership. Id. para. 9.5.
121. Water Users' Institution, Sitagunj Branch Canal, Constitution para. 10.1.2(iii)
[hereinafter Sitagunj Branch Canal Constitution].
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o wilful harm has been done to water-related infrastructure.

The local DOI office is responsible for enforcing the first three items
in the list above,'123 and, although it is unclear which body is responsible
for the punishment of wilful destruction of water-related infrastructure, it seems reasonable to assume this too would be within the remit
of the DOI. From the author's conversations with DOI officials, it
seems the DOI has not yet prosecuted a breach of the Water Resources
Act. As regards to the other circumstances listed above, active enforcement would be unrealistic because the use of water beyond the
terms of a licence is not relevant to WUAs and falls outside the licensing regime.
The relevant WUA could more appropriately deal with the stealing
of water and wilful destruction of infrastructure at least in situations
involving individuals. The WRR also allocates additional powers to
24
DWRCs with respect to terminating the service of licensed WUAs.
These bodies are authorised to cancel licences in a number of circumstances.12 However, the lack of WUA licences makes this power merely
theoretical, at least for now.' 6 With respect to enforcement of the
terms of the Water Resources Act, the DOI is also poorly placed: it has
no remit beyond irrigation management, and would consequently find
it difficult to enforce the broader provisions of the Water Resources
Act, especially in relation to licensing.
Late fees are chargeable in the event that service fees are not paid
on time. The Service Charge Fixation Committee is responsible for

122. Water Resources Act § 22(1)-(4) (1992) (Nepal).
123. Irrigation Regulation R. 40 (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file
with author).
124. See Water Resources Regulation R. 36(1) (1993) (Nepal); Water Resources Act
§21.
125. DWRCs may cancel licenses:
(1) If the licensee performs any act contrary to this Act or rules made under
this Act, the prescribed officer may issue an order to the concerned licensee
by prescribing necessary improvements to be made on such activity within the
specified period.
(2) If the licensee makes no improvement within the prescribed period pursuant to sub-section (1), the prescribed officer may cancel the license of such
person.
(3) Prior to the cancellation of [a] license pursuant to sub-section (2), the
prescribed officer shall give the licensee a reasonable opportunity to explain
his innocence.
Water Resources Act § 21.
126. The power to revoke licenses and the power to penalise transgressions is split
between two different bodies. The DWRC has the power to revoke licenses, while the
DOI has the power to penalise transgressions.
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setting the late fee,'" although this does not appear to happen in practice. This is due, in part, to the very low levels of fee collection and
also because the rates chargeable do not make pursuit cost-effective.
In many cases such committees have simply not been created.'" The
WUAs now have explicit responsibility for collecting both service
charge fees and late fees." The proposed allocation of service fees collected has been set out in the most recent Irrigation Policy, although
this apportionment does not attempt to establish fee levels.1"

Irrigation Regulation R. 30(1). However, the functions and duties of the Service
127.
Charge Fixation Committee, as set out in Rule 28, do not explicitly include setting the
level of the late fee:
The function, duties and power of Service Charge Fixation Committee shall
be as follows:
(a) To determine the minimum service charge for each crop on the basis of
average agricultural production to be increased upon the availability of the
Irrigation service.
(b) To make available the particulars and advice as sought by His Majesty's
Government from time to time.
(c) To seek advice from His Majesty's Government while making change in
the rate of service charge.
The Irrigation Regulations unfortunately does not define "late", and this lacuna is also
evident in the by-laws of the individual systems seen by the author. The point at which
"late fees" become "penalty for non-payment of service fees" is therefore debatable.
128. E-mail from Andrew Allan, author, to Basistha Raj Adhikari, Department of
Irrigation (Dec. 20 & 26) (on file with author).
129. The most recent version of the Irrigation Regulations provides: "[t]he Functions Duties and Power of the Users' Association shall be as follows:
(g) To collect service charge from users and deposit it as prescribed by concerned Irrigation office.
(h) To exclude those users who fail to pay the service charge, to collect late
charge and to inform the same to the concerned Irrigation office. Irrigation
Regulation R. 5(1).
130. Annex 2 of the Irrigation Policy 2060 sets out the following apportionment:

Level of participation in the
operation of the system

1. Water course and there
under operated by the users
association and above than
water course managed by His
Majesty's Government.
2. Tertiary and there under
operated by the users association and above than tertiary
managed by His Majesty's
Government.

Sharing of Irrigation Service Charges Collected from
Users (in Percentage)
National Treas- To be retained
Central Mainteby the water
ury of His Majnance Fund,
users associaesty's GovernDepartment of
tion
ment
Irrigation

40

40

20

30

30

40
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At the broader level, the enforcement and implementation of the
water resources legislation is sporadic at best. The licensing system
ostensibly established by the Water Resources Act and WRR does not
exist in practice. Standards for water quality, and the monitoring network necessary for measuring such limits, have not been established
and service fees are often not charged. This leaves little for an agency
to enforce.
The allocation of enforcement responsibilities creates further confusion. For example, if WUAs are autonomous, it is essential that they
take responsibility for the use and abuse of water resources within their
Accordingly, the WIUAs should be acrespective irrigated areas.'
countable for policing water theft within their areas. Currently, however, the DOI is responsible for policing water theft.' A better system
makes the DOI responsible for punishing those who steal from the
larger canals that fall within its remit and the WUAs responsible for
punishing theft within their respective areas.
Although the suspension of elected democracy that occurred with
the dissolution of parliament and elected VDC membership is not directly responsible for the weak enforcement of legislation in this area,
it probably exacerbated the situation.

3. Secondary canal and there
under operated by the users
association and above than
secondary canal managed by
His Majesty's Government.
4. All canals below than main
canal managed by the users
association and other canals
managed by His Majesty's

20

20

60

10

10

80

Government-

5. All the structures including
main canal other than head
works managed by the user
association.
6. In case of complete transI
fer of the project.

90

0

5

95

131.
See, e.g, E. Ostrom, Governingthe Commons - The Evolution of Institutionsfor Collective Action (Cambridge Univ. Press 1990), 94: in "robust institutions monitoring and sanctioning are undertaken not by external authorities but by the participantsthemselves", quoted in
STEPHEN HODGSON, DEV. LAw SERv. FAO LEGAL OMCE & WATER RES., DEv. AND MGMT.
SERV., LAND & WATER DEv. Div., LEGISLATION ON WATER USERS' ORGANISATIONS: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 88-89 n. 141 (2003).
132.
Irrigation Regulation R. 40. While the new Irrigation Regulation seeks to transfer some responsibility for the enforcement of legislation from the DOI to the relevant
WUA, the policing function remains with the DOI. Id. R. 23. For example, the WUA
has a duty to inform the DOI about damage to infrastructure, but responsibility for
punishing the breaches remains with the DOI. Id. R. 25(a).
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2. Bylaws, Constitutions and Statutes
Although anecdotal evidence suggests that the constitutive documents of WUAs are generally adhered to, the extent of enforcement is
unclear.'
In addition to rules detailing the powers and functions of
the operating committees, the constitutive documents may contain
requirements for auditing annual accounts and the representation of
women in the decision-making process. For example, the Bijayapur
and Sunsari-Morang documents require annual auditing of accounts,
which are then forwarded to the DOI, and, in the case of SunsariMorang, to the Chief District Officer, who has the power to challenge
irregularities."
Of the three WUA documents available, only the Bijayapur specifically mentions the representation of women, requiring a
target goal of 30 percent female participation."
It does not appear that any single body, other than the DOI or
Chief District Officer to a very limited extent, is responsible for ensuring compliance with WUA documnentation."'
However, this responsibility naturally falls on the WUA members. This raises the separate
question of the rights, powers, and obligations of members in general.
This article will discuss this issue later as it applies to dispute resolution
and the capacity of the various, relevant organisations. It also obliquely
raises the issue of those provisions that members will wish to enforce: it
may be difficult for gender balance targets to be achieved at the WUA
level, for example, if it is left to the WUA members to enforce such
provisions. If such targets are not met, those seeking to remedy this
will not be able to do so within the administrative structures of the
WUAs because they lack the voting power. Such targets must therefore
be properly enshrined in legislation.' 7
B. COMPLIANCE MONITORING
Currently, compliance with general pollution control rules is not
monitored because of an absence of information monitoring networks
and the paucity of enforceable standards. In order for compliance to
be effectuated, clear, measurable, and in some cases time-limited,
standards must be established. Some aspects of the Water Resources
133.

E-mail correspondence from Andrew Allan, author, to Basistha Raj Adhikari,

Department of Irrigation (on file with author).
134. See, e.g., Sitagunj Branch Canal Constitution, para. 9.1.3(b). See also infta Part
IV.B.1. (reviewing the broader aspects of auditing).
135. "Since there is negligible women's participation in every aspect of life, there
shall be at least 30 percent women's participation in days to come." Bijayapur Irrigation System By Laws, para. 9.3.
136. See infra Part IV.B.I. (discussing the general legislative obligations regarding
compliance and auditing requirements).
137. See infra Part 3.3.1 (describing the degree to which gender balance requirements are protected under the law).
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Act regime have such standards in place, but the mere existence of
these standards does not guarantee compliance.
HMG is empowered to create an Evaluation Monitoring Committee under IR Rule 43 to monitor the management and performance of
WUAs:
(1) His Majesty's Government shall constitute [an] Evaluation and
Monitoring Committee as per necessity for the evaluation and monitoring of irrigation system[s] on the basis of service provided by irrigation system[s], quality of water, crop intensity, increase of production, institutional and financial status of the Users' Association and
physical changes in the working area.
(2) The representation of irrigation Users' Association shall be introduced... while constituting [an] Evaluation and Monitoring Committee pursuant to sub [-] rule (1).1"

The author could not confirm whether an Evaluation and Monitoring Committee, or its predecessor from the previous version of the Irrigation Regulations, has ever been formed, and if so, if it has ever met.
It is also unclear who, other than representatives of the WUAs themselves, would serve on the committee. Yet, in order to ensure the
committee retains an appropriate degree of independence, it is essential that the committee is not composed of primarily WUA members.
The extent of the committee's power is significantly broader than under the previous version of the Irrigation Regulations, although the
phrase "institutional and financial status of the Users' Associations" '
gives little information regarding the details of the committee. The
increased power of the committee is a positive step, and hopefully the
new committee will receive appropriate resources.
However, questions remain regarding the role and effectiveness of
such a committee, specifically with respect to its procedures and information sources. How often will the committee meet? Will each
district establish a committee or will HMG establish a single committee
with jurisdiction over the entire country? Should the committee rely
on information provided by the WUAs or information that it either
produces itself or receives from the DOI?
Another aspect of the monitoring committee that requires examination is the enforcement of standards. The committee's focus is on
the physical elements of irrigation: the infrastructure, the quality of
water supplied, crop intensity, physical changes to the area, and the
increase in production. The WUA itself is less directly monitored.
However, arguably, better management of the WUAs improves productivity. Although the financial and "institutional" status of WUAs is ex138.
139.

Irrigation Regulation R. 43.
Id.
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pressly referred to, that does not appear to incorporate monitoring
WUAs general performance.
The functions and duties of WUAs, against which its performance
must be measured, are broadly set out in Rule 5 of the IR:
a. To repair and maintain; operate and manage the Irrigation System
operated by [the WUAs]. Provided that if it requires to change or replace the equipment affecting the Structure prior approval of the
concerned Irrigation Office shall be required.
b. To avail water to the User farmers at appropriate time[s] in proper
quantity as required by the type of crop and the condition of the land.
c. To keep the record of the land in which service could not be
availed and to recommend that such users be exempt from the Service Charge.
d. To distribute water to new User farmers without causing any harm
to the previous Users who are receiving the Service.
e. To mobilize public participation for maintenance of the Irrigation
System [.]
f. To construct additional Structures to increase irrigable area considering the supply of water.
g. To collect service charge[s] from users and deposit [them] as prescribed by [the] concerned Irrigation [O]ffice.
h. To exclude those users who fail to pay the service charge, to collect late charge[s] and to inform the same to the concerned Irrigation [O]ffice.
i. To provide notice to the concerned Irrigation Office of any information pertaining to any demolition or destruction, alteration, obstruction or any knowledge about the possibility of the same activities[,] irrigation system[,] or structure.o
More specific standards, discussed in greater detail below, apply to account reporting and gender participation.'
The Evaluation and Monitoring Committee encounters problems
because the WUAs only need to keep records relating to income and
expenditure, and services provided over the past financial year.'42 Con140.
141.
142.

Id. R. 5(1).
See infra Parts V.B.I., IV.B.2..
The Irrigation Regulation explains the records WUAs must keep as follows:
1. The Users' Association shall maintain up-to-date record including the record of the Service Charge to be paid by the Users for the use of Service made
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sequently, WUA reports do not include details relating to the quality of
water,"" crop intensity, and increase in production, or the "institutional
status" of the WIUA. Furthermore, the records do not include details of
the output of the irrigated area. The new IR's monitoring requirements are broader than the previous version and are a significant step
forward because HMG will be able to assess whether or not a particular
area is becoming more productive. The monitoring results will form
the basis for determining whether or not the WUA strategy is successful.
The Irrigation Policy establishes a new committee dedicated to
monitoring: the Central Irrigation Monitoring and Evaluation Committee."' However, this committee may be intended to fulfil the Irrigation Policy promise. No date appears to have been set for the establishment of this committee, and details of its powers and infrastructural
capacity remain unavailable. Additionally, the jurisdiction of the new
Evaluation and Monitoring Committee is still uncertain.
Compliance, however, is not simply the enforcement of standards
by a regulatory body. Compliance must also include the WUAs' ability
to enforce the standards of service they are entitled to receive under
agreements with the DOI. Yet, the IR does not contain comprehensive
details about the obligations and duties of the DOI with respect to the
service provision. In the case of joint-managed projects, the DOI may
have specific duties to adhere to according to the transfer agreement.'45
The problem with having these obligations enumerated only in the
transfer agreements is that the extent of the obligations depends in
part on the negotiating power of the relevant WUA. Additionally, the
WUA may not have the means to enforce the DOI's obligations.
The DOI is obligated to provide service to prospective new users
upon submission of an application, unless service is not possible. 4 ' A
prospective new user may challenge the DOI's refusal to provide service, except when the refusal occurred because of shortages. '47 Notification procedures must be followed when service levels are terminated

available by it showing expenditure incurred for the maintenance as well as
balance of its fund.
2. The Users' Association shall, within three months of expiry of fiscal year,
submit its report to the concerned Irrigation Office along with the financial
statements of the Users' Association and all details of the Service made available to the Users in that fiscal year.
Irrigation Regulation R. 6.
143. This assumes the monitoring network necessary to determine the quality of the
water was in place.
144.
Irrigation Policy § 2.14.1 (Nepal), http://www.doi.gov.np/irrigation-policy.pdf
(last visited May 1, 2005).
145.
Irrigation Regulation R. 13.
146.

Id. R. 18.

147.

Id. R. 22-23.
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or reduced.'48 Unless explicitly set forth in the transfer agreement, the
DOI is not bound by any performance standards. Consequently, the
DOI is largely unaccountable to the WUAs. If the DOI fails to provide
water, because of a lack of water due to drought or leaking infrastructure, or it provides water of unsuitable quality, the WUAs are, prima
facie, powerless to hold the DOI accountable. This system prevents
WUAs from assessing whether a decision to reduce service has been
based on tenable grounds, even when drought motivates the reduction, because the DOI is not obligated to make its decision-making
processes public. Although the DOI must consult with the relevant
local Irrigation Office and other Local Body,' 9 this does not include
the WUA itself."n Furthermore, these consultations do not need to be
public, and, as a result, the reasons for making a particular decision
remain hidden.
1. Auditing
WUAs must provide the DOI with their financial records within
three months of the end of each financial year.' Additionally, Rule
8 (A) of the revised IR obligates WUAs to audit their finances ' as part
of the registration renewal process. The Auditor General's Department must audit these financial reports, and the WUAs must submit
them, along with the registration renewal application, to the DOI."3
User associations' constitutive documents may also require them to
produce, audit, and present such accounts to the local district officer,
or DOI. The local district officer or DOI may or may not be able to
challenge questionable accounts. This new auditing requirement '
enables greater scrutiny of the financial condition of WUAs. Although
the DOI must give reasons for refusing a registration renewal application, there is no provision allowing a WUA to challenge such a decision. The inability to challenge such decisions, coupled with the fact

148. Id. R. 24.
149. Id. R. 22(2).
150. This assumes the term "local body" does not include WUAs. See Local SelfGovernance Act § (2) (a) (1999) (Nepal) (excluding WUAs from the definition of local
bodies),
http://www.undp.org/governance/marrakechcdrom/concepts/HMG%20Nepal%20%20Local%2Self%20Governance%20Actpdf (last visited May 1, 2005).
151. "The Users' Association shall, within three months of expiry [sic] of fiscal year,
submit its report to the concerned Irrigation Office along with the financial statement
of the Users' Association and all details of the Service made available to the Users in
that fiscal year." Irrigation Regulation R. 6(2).
152. Id. R. 8(A)(1).
153. Id. R. 8(A) (1). The capacity of the Auditor General's Office to process all WUA
accounts within ninety days of the end of the fiscal year is not certain.
154. The DOI may refuse an application for the renewal of registration. Id. R
8(A) (3). See supra Part II.B.4. (explaining the consequences of non-registration).
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that the grounds on which the DOI may refuse to grant renewal are
not explicitly set out, further reduces the transparency and predictability of DOI decisions.
Although there is no generally accepted, standard form of accounts, only a limited number of auditors may audit the accounts of
the WUAs, even at the district level. 5 WUA members, and more specifically executive members, have no obligation to be account-literate,
which is not conducive to transparent accounting. 56' However, a requirement to submit accounts would not be universally applicable because many WUAs have no involvement with cash, due to the likelihood that they do not charge service use fees.
C.REPRESENTATION

The most recent version of HMG's Irrigation Policy recognises the
importance of participatory management in achieving the goal of increased agricultural productivity.'
Participatory management can only
be successful if representative participation is in place.
Water resources legislation, constitutions, and statutes govern representation in Nepali WUAs. The statutory rules are inconsistent,
155. Audit requirements in other countries are tied to established standards rather
than a particular group of people. For example, Pakistan requires that accounts and
audit reports conform to local accounting standards. See, e.g., THE PUNJAB IRRIGATION
AND DRAINAGE AuTHoprr Acr R. 20 (1999) (Pakistan) (requiring adherence to the
standards of the Pakistan Institute of Chartered Accountants).
156. With regard to the transparency of WUA financial information, two scholars
have recommended:
0 Training in agreed financial practices for the treasurer of the WUA and
the chief financial officer of the WSP should be provided (if required). Also,
training in bookkeeping practices could be given to all WUA directors and
WSP administrative staff.
• Financial transactions should only be made with a minimum of two authorized witnesses and a record of the transaction.
0 Financial records of the WSP should be available for inspection by farmers.
0 There should be a clear basis for how the level of water fees is determined
(such as needs-based budgeting).
* Amount of water fees to be collected should be based on a known and
measurable level of service, such as volume of water delivered, area served or
number of irrigations.
0 An independent financial auditor could periodically examine WSP accounts.
0 Social ties between the WUA treasurer and WSP financial officer should
be avoided.
* The WUA treasurer should be replaced periodically.
DouGLAs L. VERMILLION & JUAN A. SAGARDOY, TRANSFER OF IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT
SERvICES: GUIDELINES 31 (1999).
157.
Irrigation
Policy
§§
1.1-1.2
(Nepal),
http://www.doi.gov.np/irrigation-policy.pdf (last visited May 1, 2005).
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however, with respect to the degree of representation required for the
formation of WUAs and relevant committees. The WRR provides:
"[p]ersons, who desire to use the water resources on [an] institutionalized basis, may form a consumers' association consisting of at least
seven persons as officials and members." 5 ' "At least seven persons, selected from among the concerned consumers desiring to register the
consumers' association, shall have to submit an application to the District Water Resources Committee in the format as [p]rescribed in
Schedule-I together with a copy of [the] statute of the consumers' association and a fee of one hundred rupees.""9
The Irrigation Regulations, conversely, requires the Executive
Committee of the WUA contain no more than eleven members." The
IR also sets out the requirements for the degree of local representation
necessary to form a WUA:
While constituting the Users' Association .

.

. there should be repre-

sentation of at least sixty[-]seven percent [of] Users of the irrigated
area of such canal, secondary canal, sub-secondary canal, tertiary canal, watercourse distributed water from which canal, secondary canal,
used.""
sub-secondary canal, tertiary, water course is to be
The WUA, therefore, needs the support of 67 percent of its potential
users before it can be formed. Additionally, a document of consent
from those users must be submitted with the application form.' Similarly, a consensus of two-thirds of the general members of a WUA can
precipitate the dissolution of its executive committee if the irrigation
Previously, the IR provided
system has not been properly operated.'
that all users of a particular system automatically became members of a
particular WUA upon registration.'" This is no longer the case, as
membership is now governed entirely by the constitutive documents of
158. Water Resources Regulation R. 3 (1993) (Nepal) (emphasis added).
159. Id. R. 4 (emphasis added). It should be noted that "consumers' associations,"
as used in the WRR, are narrower in scope than "users associations" in the Water Resources Act. The consumers' associations are concerned only with irrigation, whereas

.user associations" consist of "persons willing to make use of water resources for collective benefits on an institutional basis" and might be putting those resources to any
licensable use. Water Resources Act § 5 (1992) (Nepal).
160. Irrigation Regulation R. 3(1) (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file
with author) (emphasis added).
161. Id. R. 3(2). Note that under the previous version of the Irrigation Regulation,
R.3 also contained a clause stating that "[elach, user shall be deemed to have been
ipso facto general member of such Association." Id. R. 3(2).
162. Id. R. 3(2). Pursuant to Schedule 1 of the Irrigation Regulation, two copies of
the WUA constitution must also be submitted with the registration application. Id.
sched. 1.
163. Id. R. 4(2).
(Nepal),
R.
3(2)
(2000)
Regulation
164. Irrigation
http://www.doi.gov.np/doi/ID2/3/index.html (last visited May 1, 2005).
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the WUA.' It is possible that the new rule may consequently be used to
exclude tenant farmers, and those without security of tenure, from
membership of the WUA, although in practice this would be dependent upon the rules of the WUA itself as regards the admission of new
members. Regardless of whether or not this may be possible, the
change in the legislation does nothing to strengthen the position of
the more disadvantaged farmers and enhances the opportunities for
more powerful farmers to pursue their own agenda either inside or
outside the WUA system.
1. Gender Balance
The Irrigation Policy sets out the government's intention to involve
women in the irrigation management decision-making process. It
states, the "[u]ser association shall be composed of with [sic] at least
thirty [-] three percent of the women representation.
166 Neither the
Water Resources Act nor the WRR contain a provision for the representation of women. The revised Irrigation Regulations, however, does
contain such a provision. 6 ' As for the monitoring and enforcement of
this provision, it is unclear whether or not the DOI has such powers."
In the farmer-managed scheme, the author visited, two women did
indeed sit on the committee, "' but the author was unconvinced that
their role amounted to much more than a box-ticking formality.
Aside from the representation of women in WUAs and the provisions in the LSGA, the remaining legislation generally fails to address
the issue of gender balance in other decision-making bodies. For example, the LSGA obligates VDC members to create a list of arbitrators
available for dispute resolution procedures, three of whom will be chosen to sit on cases."' The list of potential arbitrators must include
women and "backward class [es] ,"..but the VDCs are not obligated to
165. Irrigation Regulation R. 3(2) (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file
with author).
166. Irrigation Policy § 2.4.3 (Nepal), http://www.doi.gov.np/irrigation policy.pdf
(last visited May 1, 2005).
167. Irrigation Regulation R. 3 (requiring thirty-three percent of the Executive
Committee to be women).
168. See supraPart IV.B. (discussing compliance issues in more detail).
169. The previous version of the Irrigation Regulation required two women to serve
on the executive committee.
Irrigation Regulation R. 3(1) (2000) (Nepal),
http://www.doi.gov.np/doi/ID2/3/index.html (last visited May 1, 2005).
170. Local
Self-Governance
Act
§§
34(2),
35
(1999)
(Nepal),
http://www.undp.org/governance/marrakechcdrom/concepts/HMG%20Nepal%20%20Local%20Self%20Governance%2OAct.pdf (last visited May 1, 2005). See infra Part
IV.E. (detailing additional information on the dispute resolution process).
171. "The Village Development Committee shall have to include the women and
back Ard [sic] class as well, to the extent possible, in the list of arbitrators referred to
in sub-section (1)." Id. § 35(2). See also id. § 103(3) (detailing similar requirements for
municipalities).
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ensure that arbitrators chosen for a particular case include these persons. Although the LSGA does not establish particular targets for the
representation of women or disadvantaged groups in the arbitration
process, the Municipal Council, under the same legislation, must consist of at least 40 percent women."' HMG has the power to monitor
local bodies... to assess whether they have "accorded necessary priority
However,
to the backward communities, women and children ....
because the standards are insufficiently rigorous, and HMG is not obligated to carry out such monitoring, the effectiveness of this provision is
doubtful, even aside from the current dormancy of local bodies.
Additionally, the local Irrigation Office has no standards to adhere
to, and the DWRCs need not contain any women at all. 7' Furthermore, the level of female participation may not be set at the correct
level, as there may be irrigation areas where women constitute more or
less than one-third of the population. It remains to be seen how successful the government will be in fulfilling the Irrigation Policy's objective of female participation. The level set by the policy is not unchallengeable either; presumably irrigation areas are not populated by
groups consisting of only one-third women, so it is questionable
whether that standard is, in fact, accurate in the first place.
2. Representation of Other Disadvantaged Groups
The revised IR requires the representation of so-called "backward"
parts of Nepali society. Rule 3 requires the Executive Committees of
WUAs to contain two members drawn from the "dalit, downtrodden
and backward ethnic community,"76 when possible. The last phrase is
an important qualification to the rule, because the legislation does not
provide factors for determining whether the dalit are available to serve
on the Executive Committee. Availability may depend upon the
demographics of the irrigated area, the willingness of the dalit community to participate, and perhaps most importantly, the willingness of
the rest of the community to accept their participation. While the
general rule is admirable in its intent, 77' the "availability" qualification
renders it virtually useless.

172. Id. § 76(2).
173. Id. § 2(a) (defining "Local Body" as the "Village Development Committee,
Municipality and District Development Committee.").
174. Id.§ 234(l).
175. SeeWater Resources Regulation R. 8 (1993) (Nepal).
176. Irrigation Regulation R. 3 (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file with
author).
177.
The Irrigation Policy states: "there shall be representation of dalit, doAntrodden and backward ethnic communities" in user associations, but the question of avail2.4.3
(Nepal),
Irrigation
Policy
§
ability
is
not
addressed.
http://www.doi.gov.np/irrigadon-policy.pdf (last visited May 1, 2005).
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A related issue is who "users" are as defined in Rule 3 of the Irriga"User" is sufficiently broad to include not only
landowners, but also tenant farmers. "Users" may also encompass
sharecroppers, farmers with no security of tenure. However, in practice, such a broad definition is not adhered to at the WUA level. For
instance, in the Bijayapur system, an "ordinary member" of the WUA is
defined as a beneficiary of the system.' 9 However, paragraph 5 provides that one male and one female member of each landowning or
tenant household shall be accorded membership of the WUA, thereby
excluding farmers lacking legal status.'80 The implementation of the
broader legislative requirement is, therefore, limited by the constitutive documents of the WIUAs themselves.
The question of membership in this respect is fraught with difficulty. Some have argued that users with only short-term interests in
the irrigation systems'8 ' may possess an economic interest in postponing essential infrastructure repair work.'
Additionally, if sharecroppers are allowed to participate in the WUAs, and are given voting rights
in WUAs, what voting rights should attach to a particular parcel of
land? Should the sharecroppers have rights within the WUA in addition to, or in place of, the respective landowner or tenant? In other
words, can one area of land be the basis for more than one vote?' 3

tion Regulations. "'

D.

CONSULTATION

Nepal's water resources legislation contains a small number of instances where decision-making processes must involve consultation,
while the Irrigation Policy emphasises the importance of integrating
the DOI and the Department of Agriculture, both horizontally and
vertically.'84 The practical application of the consultation requirement,
178. See Irrigation Regulation R. 3. See also supra Part IV.C. (providing further information on representation).
179. Bijayapur Irrigation System By Laws, para. 2(h).
180. Id. para. 5. See HODGSON, supra note 131, at 32-35 (illustrating how other parts
of the world legislate on this issue, though the author does not comment on the effectiveness of these approaches).
181. For example, those users who do not know if they will be farming the same land
in the following year because they are subject to the demands of the landowner.
182. See HODGSON, supra note 131, at 33.
183. Voting rights are complicated somewhat by the issue of absentee landlords, who
may have voting rights but who take little interest in the day-to-day operation of the
organisation. It seems doubtful that absentee landlords would give up their rights in
WUAs if voting accrued to a specific piece of land, because this would mean the land
user in situ would most likely hold such a vote. Alternately, giving voting rights to
sharecroppers might encourage landowners to accept more sharecroppers on smaller
areas of land, because this would increase the landlord's voting power.
184. "The district, regional and central offices of the Department of Irrigation and
Department of Agricultural shall be functionally tied up and coordinated in the process of implementation, follow up and evaluation from the level of identification and
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however, is less clear. Consultation performs the multiple roles of improving public participation, alleviating the difficulties caused by imprecise allocation of responsibilities and awkward geographical
boundaries, and of facilitating the integration of all relevant factors
into the decision making process.
Currently, the DOI is not obligated to consult with the MOPE to
ensure that the two licensing bodies are not issuing mutually incompatible licences.'85 In fact, the DOI, as the nominal registration body, is
not obligated to consult with any other organisations or individuals.
The practice set out in the WRR for the DWRC also does not require
consultation. The role of the Ministry of Water Resources as licensor
of hydropower projects does not appear to necessitate consultation
with any other body either. Additionally, licensing and registration
authorities of any sort are not required to communicate with their
peers in other districts regarding inter-district watercourses. Lastly, the
delineation of boundaries on a political level instead of a hydrological
one exacerbates the potential problems, while increasing the need for
consultation.
When required, the degree to which others are involved in the decision-making process ranges from mere notification to "consultation,"
the latter implying some level of dialogue. Instances where the legislation requires this involvement are effectively limited to the following
three examples. First, in the event that service is reduced or terminated under Rules 22 or 23 of the Irrigation Regulations, the DOI
must notify the relevant WUA and local body.' 6 In addition, where
demand for water exceeds supply and the Project Office determines
that a reduction of service is required, it must "consult with the concerned Irrigation Office . . . and the concerned local body"' 87 and "coordinate" with the affected WUA"' If the Project Office is the WUA
itself, there is no obligation to consult with all members, except where
the constitutive documents and administrative processes of the WUA
demand otherwise.
Second, Rule 19 of the WRR requires the DWRC to publish public
notice of all water licence applications it receives. ' The DWRC may
impose conditions on the licence, if necessary, to reduce any adverse
effects of the water use. Third, the EPR contains provisions requiring
consultation with the relevant VDCs and Municipalities in order to
selection of the project to irrigate the irrigation and agricultural development programs.Irrigation
Policy
§
2.13.4
(Nepal),
http://www.doi.gov.np/irrigation-policy.pdf (last visited May 1, 2005).
185. See supra Part II.B. 1. (discussing the licensing scheme).
186. Irrigation Regulation R. 24 (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file
with author).
187. Id. R. 22(2).
188. Id. R. 22(1).
189. Water Resources Regulation R. 19(1), (3) (1993) (Nepal).
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ascertain whether the pollution associated with an application for a
Pollution Control Certificate will adversely affect the environment."
The licensing body must confirm with the VDCs and Municipalities to
ensure there is no risk of a "substantial adverse impact" on the environment, or that there is at least a possibility that any such effects can
be alleviated. ' The views of the potentially affected WUAs are not included in this process.
E. DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND ACCESS TOJUSTICE

Generally, the dispute resolution procedures WUAs adopt are not
statutorily based. The legislation is relatively silent on dispute resolution and lacks detailed processes. No single body has the responsibility
for all dispute resolution, although a number of bodies may claim limited jurisdiction in certain circumstances. There are a number of levels at which conflicts may arise and where dispute resolution or access
to justice may be necessary:
1. disputes between individual users in a WUA;
2. disputes between conflicting users, whether licensed or unlicensed, of a watercourse in a single district;
3. disputes between users of a watercourse that straddles two or more
districts;
4. challenges to WUAs' decisions;

5. challenges to DOI or DWRC decisions; and
6. challenges to HMG decisions when it issues
under the IR or WRR.

overriding directives

Formally, WUAs play no role in any of the above disputes, as their
functions ' do not include this aspect of irrigation management. During the author's visit to the farmer-managed systems at Dodhikot and
Balkot, the impression received was that the WUAs themselves would
resolve disputes between individual members, although there is no
legislative basis for this and the processes followed in such cases would
be unique to each WUA.
The WRR, however, provides for the establishment of a Water Resources Utilisation Inquiry Committee to settle any disputes that arise

ch.
3
(1997)
(Nepal),
Protection
Rules
190. Environment
http://www.mope.gov.np/environment/chapter3.php (last visited May 1, 2005).
191.
Id.
192. See Water Resources Act § 8 (1992) (Nepal); Water Resources Regulation R. 8.
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during the utilisation of water resources.' 3 This committee, which appears to operate at the district level, consists of at least three members.'94 The purpose of the committee is apparently to address conflicts
arising between users, whether licensed or unlicensed, of a watercourse
in a single district and conflicts between users of a watercourse that
straddles two or more districts. In effect, though, the committee's focus is on, and may potentially be limited to, addressing issues normally
assessed at the licensing stage, such as environmental impacts and
whether a proposed use would be broadly beneficial or detrimental.'95
Currently, the DWRC would not assess these issues when licensing
a particular water use and possible conflicts would be identified only if
the public filed objections. ' The DWRC, taking into account the factors set out in Rule 28(3) of the WRR"' and the priorities set out in
Section 7 of the Water Resources Act,' 9 may determine that a particular water resource use is not beneficial and may either prohibit that use
or attach conditions to the use. Because the DWRC is responsible for
approving licensable water uses, the implication is that DWRC may
only prohibit or attach conditions to licensable uses. Accordingly, the
DWRC would lack the capacity to take any action against WUAs registered under the Irrigation Regulations. The Water Resources Act does

193. Water Resources Regulation R. 28.
194. These members are representatives from the following organisations: the Ministry of Water Resources, the relevant District Development Board, and the regional
office of the National Planning Commission. Additionally, if the dispute is between
two districts, representatives from all concerned district development boards will be
members of the commission. Id. R. 28(1)-(2).
195. See id. R. 28(3). These provisions relate primarily to disputes arising out of
proposed uses of water resources. Accordingly, the National Planning Commission has
a member on the Water Resources Utilisation Inquiry Committee. However, such a
representative does not sit on the DWRC itself and would, therefore, not otherwise
participate in the water utilisation licensing process.
196. See id. R. 18-19. See also supra Part V.D. (explaining the role of consultation in
various decision-making processes).
197. Water Resources Regulation R. 28(3) (b)(i)-(viii).
198. The Water Resources Act states:
(2) If a dispute arises while utilizing water resources, the prescribed committee [i.e., the DWRC] shall, on the basis of priority order as set out in subsection (1), the beneficial use or misuse made of the water resources in accordance with sub-section (3) of Section 4 ["A person or a corporate body
making use water resources shall make its beneficial use without causing
damage to other."] and also by conducting other necessary enquiries, decide
as to whether or not or in what manner such use could be made.
(3) The decision made by the prescribed committee pursuant to sub-section
(2) shall be valid to all concerned.
(4) The procedure of the committee, as prescribed pursuant to sub-section
(2), while deciding on matters mentioned on that sub-section, shall be as prescribed.
Water Resources Act § 7(2)-(4) (1992) (Nepal).
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not permit appeal of DWRC decisions, 99' and does not provide further
detail about how the inquiry body functions. The DOI enforces the
Water Resources Act provisions relating to the misuse of water.'
However, the DOI does not have a legislative role in administering
justice regarding WUAs, and DOI decisions, other than denial of prospective users, cannot be appealed."0 ' Prospective users can appeal to
the same body that made the original decision; however, the decision
of the local Irrigation Office is final, so an aggrieved prospective user
has no additional appeal procedures." ' Other decisions by the DOI,
such as the registration of WUAs, reduction or termination of service,
or the enforcement of DOI standards are not open to review or challenge, leaving users with no right of recourse.'
Finally, one other body has ostensible jurisdiction to hear cases at
the local level: the VDC, under the LSGA' Interestingly, the LSGA,
which is currently in abeyance because of the lack of elected local bodies, contains the most detailed provisions relating to the resolution and
avoidance of disputes by VDCs. However, it is regarded as largely unworkable by DOI because of the differences in hydrological and administrative boundaries, and because it is apparently felt that, politically, the WUAs rather than the VDCs should be empowered to collect
irrigation service fees.
The jurisdiction of the VDCs includes: "[ciases on border[s]/boundar[ies] of land, public land, Sandhi Sarpan (inconvenience in respect of boundary or way-outs), Aali Dhur. canals, dams,
ditches or allocation of water and encroachment on roads or way-outs.
• . [and]

compensation for damage of crops .... "20' The VDC must

form an arbitration board for the purpose of hearing such cases."'
See id. § 7(3) ("The decision ... shall be valid to all concerned.").
199.
200. See supra Part IV.A.1. (addressing enforcement and compliance issues with water resources legislation).
201. The Irrigation Regulation provides:
1. If a person not satisfied with the notification server pursuant to sub-R. (2) of
Rule 18 of the decision to the effect that the Service could not be made available, such person may submit a complaint against such decision to the concerned Irrigation Office within thirty-five days of such decision.
2. The concerned Irrigation Office shall conduct the necessary inquiries on
the compliant received pursuant to sub-R.(1) and issue an order. And such
order shall be final.
Irrigation Regulation R. 19 (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file with author).
202. Id.
203. See id. R. 3-5, 22-23, 40-45 (establishing the rules that authorize the DOI to register WUAs, reduce or terminate service, and enforce DOI standards; the rules do not
include mechanisms for appeal or reconsideration).
204. See Local Self-Governance Act § 33.
205. Id.§ 33(a)-(b). Negotiation is encouraged prior to pursuing arbitration. Id.§
37(1).
206. Id. § 34(2).
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Three arbitrators are chosen from the board and agreed upon by the
parties."7 The LSGA, unlike other water resources legislation, provides
details about the decision-making process for hearing and administering cases."'
Significantly, the LSGA permits either party, if dissatisfied with the
decision of the arbitrators, to appeal to the relevant district court. '
Currently, however, this process is in abeyance because of the lack of
VDC membership. Additionally, the performance of the court system
in general has not been assessed as part of this project. Thus, it is not
clear if a right of appeal from other tribunals would be rendered impractical because of the interminable hearings process of the district
courts. Enforcement of arbitration decisions is the responsibility of the
VDCs in the first instance, and ultimately, that of the Land Revenue
Office. '
In summation, the decisions of the DOI and HMG are largely unchallengeable. At one level, the HMG's decision-making is not open to
public review because of the temporary suspension of democracy in
Nepal. At the water resources management level, the IR and the WRR
empower the HMG to issue directives that must be implemented without question."' However, it has not been possible to assess the potential power of the court to use the judicial review as a check on government decisions.
V.CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As will be evident from the above outline of the legislative framework with respect to water resource management in Nepal, a number
of major issues must be addressed before improvements may be
made."' Unfortunately, however, the political and economic situation

207. Id. § 34(2). Alternative arbitrators may be appointed from outside the board in
the event that the parties cannot agree. Id. § 34(3).
208. Id. §§ 33-42 (providing comprehensive instructions for forming and running
VDCs). See also supra Parts IV.C.1. - IV.C.2. (describing the requirements imposed on
VDCs to include women and "backward classes" in the arbitration board).
209.
Local Self-Governance Act § 40.
210. Id. § 41.
211.
Irrigation Regulation R. 41 (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file
with author); Water Resources Regulation R. 39 (1993) (Nepal).
In the event that a major effort is made to overhaul the current legislative
212.
framework in order to achieve a coherent and comprehensive water code, a number of
elements should be considered crucial. Tarlock's view is that a successful water code
should possess the following attributes:
1) development of a permit system to give the state control of the allocation
and reallocation of water used by public and private entities.
2) The creation of public rights for the allocation or reallocation of water for
the maintenance of aquatic ecosystems services and the restoration of degraded riverine environments.
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in the country inevitably means that the ideal regulatory environment
for irrigation management will not be put in place in the short term.
In conclusion, then, recommendations will be made below that seek to
derive the maximum improvement from the minimum legislative tinkering. The aim is to imbue the WUA system with the credibility and
legitimacy that farmers require before they will participate fully and
actively. Without this legitimacy, both in terms of purpose and of governance, farmers will continue to be unwilling to pay for the WUA and
the improvement of the irrigation systems. By establishing good governance of the WUAs, it is hoped that it will be possible to break the
"vicious cycle of low O&M expenditure leading to poor performance and increasing reluctance on the part of farmers to pay when they see no benefit.""'5
Following the structure of this paper, a slightly artificial distinction has
been made between allocation matters and governance - the latter will
be more concerned with procedural administrative issues.
A.ALLOCATION

Before making recommendations regarding concrete reforms to
the relevant legislation in the short-term, the following summarizes the
gaps and flaws in the current framework and suggests remedial measures.

3) Procedures such as regulated markets to reallocate water from marginal
agriculture to more efficient uses, both urban and environmental.
4) Special protections, either water reserves or financial transfers, to protect
rural, generally poor, areas that may face the loss of water and livelihood opportunities.
5) The creation of rights to protect at-risk minority groups such as indigenous peoples and other people who have developed sustainable customary
use practices.
6) The limitation of groundwater mining.
7) Special procedures to declare river and ground water basins closed to new
uses.
8) The ground rules for temporary, emergency sharing.
9) A recognition that water plans need to factor in possible adaptations to
global climate change which threatens to alter rainfall patterns and create
more extreme cycles of flood and drought, especially in arid countries.
10) The procedure for the enforcement and quantification of rights.
11) The development of more inclusive decision making processes.
12) The coordination of water quantity and quality regulation.
A. DAN TARLocK, NATIONAL WATER LAw: THE FOUNDATION OF SUSTAINABLE WATER USE
120, 123 (2004). While not all of the above are directly applicable to Nepal, the conclusions and recommendations made below broadly reflect the priorities identified by
Tarlock, but attempt to do so within the context of the available regulatory and institutional environment
213.

WATER CHARGING IN IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE:

LESSONS FROM THE LITERATURE,

REPORT OD145, at 44 (B. Bosworth et al. eds.,
2002), available at
http://www.hrwallingford.co.uk (including a number of other useful reports located
in the Water Publications section of the HR Wallingford website).
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1. Conclusions
No catchment-wide system of water use management is in place.
The WRR has not been implemented, and activities that would otherwise be licensable under the Water Resources Act are consequently
uncontrolled. Integrated Water Resources Management implemented
through a comprehensive licensing system would protect WUAs to the
extent that water allocation would be more controlled than it is currently in its quantitative and qualitative aspects. A number of bodies
are ostensibly responsible for controlling particular types of water use,
but there is no single body with the power to oversee all uses, and the
mechanisms for facilitating the transfer of relevant information between the existing bodies is inadequate.
1. The DWRC is not obligated to take into account the following
fundamental considerations in allocating water use: (a) environmental and ecosystem requirements; (b) the quantity and quality of
available resources; and (c) any other uses of a particular watercourse. 14 Although priorities for utilisation are set out in Section 7 of
the Water Resources Act,215 the DWRC is not explicitly obligated to
take these considerations into account when approving applications
for licences under Rules 18 through 20 of the WRR!"1
2. Although the WRR requires licence renewal within the time frame
specified in each licence, there is no statutory maximum duration for
7
water use licences other than hydropower licences." DWRCs do not
of licences.
alter
the
terms
have the power to review, or if necessary,
The allocation scheme, therefore, is not flexible enough to adapt to
changing circumstances. In periods of shortage, upstream users are
protected by licences issued subject "to the extent of water resources
of such place and area as specified in the licence.""'
3. Water use rights are allocated on the basis of political boundaries,
not hydrological ones. Accordingly, watercourse uses in other districts may impact downstream uses, including irrigation. However,
unless the public brings these uses to the attention of the DWRs,
they may not be aware of downstream uses and might not consider
their importance when issuing licences. This problem could be ameliorated by making usage registries available to all district bodies on a

214. See Water Resources Regulation R. 17-18, 20 (requiring water use applications
to include details such as analysis of environmental effects of the proposed project, but
allowing the DWRC to issue a license without explicit evaluation of these impacts).
215. Water Resources Act § 7(1) (a)-(h) (1992) (Nepal).
216. See Water Resources Regulation R. 18-20 (detailing the requirements of water
use applications; fails to mention the list of priorities).
217. Id. R. 26(1).
218. Id. R. 22.
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particular watercourse, and creating a requirement in the WRR that
licensing bodies take into account all uses on the watercourse.
4. There is no watercourse-based process for the allocation of water
resources during times of shortage. The IR allows the relevant Project
Office, the local DOI, WUA, licensee, or otherwise, to allocate water
to their users.2 1 9 The DWRC plays no role in this process.
5. Pollution control monitoring is deficient, with the result that
WUAs may suffer from problems caused, for example, by industrialisation and municipal waste.
6. The incentive for farmers to participate in WUAs, and to engage
with the authorities to formally establish such entities, is limited due
to the administrative burdens imposed and by the want of necessity to
do so.

2. Recommendations
If integrated water resource management is pursued, the ideal
situation would be for a single body to allocate and approve all uses of

water resources. ° Currently, irrigation user groups only need to register with the relevant district's DOI office. The Water Resources Act
details what uses of water resources are permissible without a licence.'
There is no immediate hope that this provision can be changed because primary legislation may only be changed with the approval of
Parliament, though secondary legislation may be modified by the
Cabinet. As Parliament is currently suspended, only secondary legislation can realistically be altered. Consequently, the following changes
to existing legislation would help remedy the above problems, without
undertaking the ideal large-scale reform:...
1. WUAs should continue to register with the local DOI office pursu-

ant to the Irrigation Regulations. However, unlike the current system,
the district WUA registries should be made available to the public.
219. See Irrigation Regulation R. 5(1)(b)-(d), 10, 18-24, 37 (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file with author) (granting the WUA, DOI, and other licensees
the authority to allocate water).
220. The Water Resources Strategy sets out plans to incorporate decision-making
regarding new irrigation schemes within broader river basin management. WATER
RESOURCES STRATEGY, supra note 1, para. 6.5.3.1.
221. WaterResourcesAct§ 4(2)(a)-(e) (1992) (Nepal).
222. Such large-scale reform involves implementation of an integrated water resource use allocation programme, including pollution control under the primary control of a single independent body, eradication of corruption, and the development of a
democratic government. On February 1, 2005, King Gyanendra declared a state of
emergency in Nepal, dismissed his government and assumed direct control himself. It
remains to be seen how and when democratic government will return to Nepal, but
these recommendations must assume that it will.
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The local VDC offices could be used for public viewing of the registries at a local level. These registries should also be available to the licensing and registration bodies in all other districts on the same watercourse. Although a single licensing body is desirable, this compromise, coupled with the recommendations in point two below,
should enable the licensing and registering bodies to account for all
of the available information, rather than focusing narrowly on a particular aspect of water use.
2. Notification procedures need to be established for inter-district
watercourses, such that when either the DWRC or the district DOI offices receive an application for a licence or registration, DOI offices,
the MOPE, and the relevant DWRCs can be informed and have the
opportunity to comment. This should also be the case with respect to
environmental assessments of projects that may affect other uses of affected watercourses.
3. Registration requirements should be enhanced. Currently, prospective WUAs do not need to submit information about the number
of users, crops grown, or the extent of the irrigated area. If the
WUAs' right of use is to be protected, it is imperative that other licensing bodies have as much information as reasonably provided.
Thus, the register should contain this information, and if possible a
map of the irrigated area. The map should indicate the actualarea irrigated, rather than its theoretical extent.
4. Currently, the IR does not obligate the DOI to take any factors
into consideration when deciding whether or not to register a WUA."'
The IR could be altered to obligate the DOI to consider the priorities
listed in Section 7(1) of the Water Resources Act. However, the DOI
must also be required to contemplate the following factors in addition
to those set out in the WRA:
"

Environment and ecosystem requirements;' 2'

" Other uses made of the watercourse that are, or should be, licensed under the WRR, or controlled under the EPR;
0 Uses made of the relevant watercourse in other districts, where the
watercourse is a transboundary one;22

223. See id. R. 3(3) (requiring the DOI to determine only discrepancies or duplications in applications).
224. Although the VDCs and Municipalities have pollution prevention duties under
the Local Self-Governance Act, it is presently unclear how their responsibilities interface with those of the MOPE. If such duties are actually carried out by the local bodies,
the decision-making processes of the DOI, DWRC, and MOPE must also take into consideration the pollution prevention plans of the VDCs and the Municipalities where
appropriate.
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* The availability of the resource, in terms of both quantity and
quality;
* The pollution tolerance levels and water quality standards established under Sections 18 through 19 of the WRA;'26
" The National Water Resource Strategy.
* Equity - this might provide some basis for ensuring that WUAs are
not established in such a way that certain water users in the irrigated
area are patently discriminated against.
5. The criteria to be used by the Project Offices in distributing water
to its respective users should be also be broadened to include equity.
Coupled with the requirements as regards improved transparency in
the annual reports detailed below, this might provide a foundation
for greater focus on the provision of water to tail farmers especially,
and to more disadvantaged farmers in general.
6. The licensing process set out in the WRR, subject to the other recommendations herein, should be implemented. However, the regulation is currently inadequate as to the considerations that may affect
the DWRC's decision. Therefore, instead of making a judgement
based on whether the requisite documents have been provided,2 7 the
DWRC should adhere to the list of priorities listed in Section 7 of the
Water Resources Act, as well as the following factors:
" Environment and ecosystem requirements;
" Other uses made of the watercourse that are registered under the
IR (i.e. irrigation) or controlled under the EPR;
* Uses made of the relevant watercourse in other districts, where the
watercourse is transboundary;
o The availability of the resource, in terms of both the quantity and
quality;
a The pollution tolerance levels and water quality standards to be set
under the Sections 18 through 19 of the WRA;
225. The DOI must also take into account the rights, duties, and obligations of Nepal under relevant international agreements where the relevant watercourse is international in nature.
226. See Section 27 of South Africa's National Water Act for an example of a licensing authority being required to take such factors into consideration. § 27 (l)(g), (j) of
1998,
Water
Act
36
of
National
http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Legislature/nw-act/NWA.pdf (last visited May 1,
2005).
227. SeeWater Resources Regulation R. 13(1), 18(1) (1993) (Nepal).
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The National Water Resource Strategy.

These factors will help ensure the licensing and registration regimes,
as consistent as possible with each other.
7. In order to ensure the decision-making processes are as integrated
as possible, the following improvements to the constitutions of the
registering and licensing bodies should be made:
* A member of the MOPE, or2 its licensing arm, should be added to
the constitution of the DWRC; 1
e The DOI's registration decisions with respect to WUAs should be
made in consultation with the DWRC and the MOPE;
* The MOPE should be required to obtain and consider the opinions of the relevant DWRC(s) and DOI office(s), in addition to the
organisations listed in Schedule 7 of the EPR when issuing pollution
control certificates.
8. The water use licences issued by the DWRC should be added to
the public registry. This will require amending the WRR.
9. The DOI and DWRC, as registering and licensing authorities respectively, must take a pivotal role in the allocation of water resources
in times of shortage. The DWRC, as the primary licensing body,
would probably be best suited to take on this role, subject to the improvements suggested above. Relevant changes, therefore, need to be
made to the WRR, with appropriate cross-references in the Irrigation
Regulations, to ensure water uses registered under those regulations
are also subject to the decisions of the DWRC in times of shortage. As
a corollary, maximum durations must be set with respect to water
utilisation licences so that perpetual rights are no longer possible.
The DWRC should also have the power to review licences in the light
of water resource changes, although the rights of licence holders
must be protected in order to imbue the licences with the necessary
credibility.2"
10. Finally, the licensing of water pollution will only be feasible if a
pollution-monitoring network is put in place. To this end, HMG must
do three things:

228. Currently, a member of the DOI is already required to sit on the DWRC. Id. R.
8. Adding a member of the MOPE should facilitate better communication about using
watercourses for irrigation purposes.
229. In South Africa, licenses are reviewed no more than every five years, although
the duration of the license itself cannot be altered. See §§ 28(1) (f), 49(1) of National
Water Act 36 of 1998.
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• Establish comprehensive ELVs for the polluting industries listed in
the EPR;
* Set pollution tolerance levels and water quality standards for watercourses under the powers set out in the WRA;" 0
- Establish a pollution-monitoring network capable of supporting
the above limits and standards.

B. GOVERNANCE
1. Conclusions
The administration of water resources management in Nepal is neither based on clear and comprehensive regulation nor enforced rigorously. The lack of enforcement is partly a result of the insufficiency of
regulation, and is compounded by the dearth of available resources
and the unwillingness of WUAs to accept the responsibilities for operation and maintenance the legislation imposes upon them. Such reluctance is understandable to some extent because the legislation sets out
the responsibilities of the WUAs, but neither offers correlative duties to
be adhered to by any of the licensing or registering authorities, nor
provides the WUA with commensurate rights and powers to carry out
these responsibilities. Additionally, there is not enough transparency
or accountability at any level. Improving transparency and accountability is a prerequisite to WUA members regarding the system as
credible and fair. Furthermore, establishing credibility is the first step
toward improving cost recovery rates and agricultural efficiency. The
recommendations below seek to consolidate the current system to obtain the maximum benefit, without imposing a disproportionate administrative burden.
2. Recommendations

a. Reporting
1. Currently, the annual reports WUAs provide the DOI include income, expenditure, and details of services provided throughout the
fiscal year. These reports should also include the following:
a Irrigation outputs; productivity reports are needed to measure the
efficiency of an irrigated area.
- A list of the parts of the irrigated area for which service could not
be provided, along with their location. At present, WUAs are obli230.

Water Resources Act §§ 18-19 (1992) (Nepal).
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gated to keep records of "the land in which service could not be
availed and to recommend to exempt the Service Charge to be paid
by such Users.""' By noting the location of land that does not receive
water, one could track instances where tail farmers are being deprived
of water as a result of excess water use by upstream farmers. The performance of the WUA could be measured in part by its ability to provide water equitably to all members. This will have a corresponding
impact on the credibility of the WUA, especially with tail farmers.
Additionally, cost recovery may be enhanced, along with agricultural
efficiency. This will also encourage WUAs to be more efficient with
water use.
*

The General Assembly of the WUA should approve these annual

reports 2

2. The DOI should produce an annual report detailing the progress
of the WUAs on a number of indicators. These indicators might include:
* Information relating to the levels of cost recovery and changes in
production efficiency by WUAs, based on the information WUAs provide as part of the registration renewal process;
*

Reductions in the level of member's lands that cannot be served;

" Information regarding the application of distribution priorities as
set out in Rule 21 of the IR;
9 Details about WUA compliance with gender balance requirements;
a Levels of DOI compliance with the performance standards established for particular projects;
* Details of WUA registrations and renewals, including conditions
attached to renewals;
a Periods where service to WIUAs has been reduced, with reasons for
reductions; and
*

Information regarding appeals and challenges of DOI decisions.

231. Irrigation Regulation R. 5(l)(c) (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on
file with author).
232. This may already be reflected in the constitutive documents of WUAs, as is the
case in Bijayapur, but having an explicit requirement will enhance the transparency of
the WUAs. See Bijayapur Irrigation System Constitution, supranote 55, para. 9.
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The new Evaluation and Monitoring Committee could have the responsibility for enforcing these measures. DOI performance in providing services must also be assessed, and the annual report should
form the basis of this assessment.
3. While the new renewal requirement with respect to registration is
to be welcomed, it is deficient in the following ways:
The information to be included in the required annual report should
be set out and directly linked with the data required by the Evaluation
and Monitoring Committee. In addition to this monitoring information, details should also be provided to indicate the level of compliance with representation requirements relating to gender and oppressed groups.
The basis on which the DOI may refuse applications for renewal is not
clear. A list of grounds should be set out, and this may include:
" Outstanding service fees;
* Inadequate accounts. For example, as a result of being:
o unaudited,
o unapproved by auditors,
o fraudulent, or
o where gross financial mismanagement on the part of the WUA is
indicated
0

Late submission of accounts and annual report.

These measures should not contribute greatly to the administrative
burden imposed on WUAs. However, the question of the timing of
renewal remains potentially problematic: there is no evidence to suggest that the Auditor General's Office has the capacity to audit all
WUA accounts properly within ninety days of the end of the financial
year, and this mayjeopardise the prospects of a WUA meeting the renewal deadline set out in IR rule 8A. This will depend on whether
the term "fiscal year" used in the IR relates to the financial year of the
individual WUA or to the general accounting financial year.
It should also be recognised that the DOI may wish to apply sanctions
other than the simple refusal to renew. For example, it might approve an application, but attach conditions, with the threat of deregistration being applied in the event of non-compliance. If the renewal is linked to the flow of water or government funds, it is far
more likely that WUAs will continue to maintain their registration.
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b. Miscellaneous
4. The gender balance requirements for WUA membership, which
currently vary across the legislation, should be harmonised. As discussed earlier, under the LSGA, Municipalities must have at least 40
percent female membership, while the Irrigation Policy requires that
one-third of the membership to be female. The harmonised level
should, at a minimum, reflect one of those standards, though the
ideal target should be 50 percent. The harmonised level should be
applied to WUAs under the Irrigation Regulations, and to the DWRC
under the WRR. The apparent lack of gender equality goals at the
government level should also be addressed.
5. Rather than setting out a standard form for WUAs' constitutions
and by laws, a requirement should be inserted into the IR mandating
that the constitutive documents of WUAs be consistent with prevailing
legislation."'
6. The DOI must be obligated to set out the reasons for its decisions. 23 ' This will enhance the accountability and transparency of the
DOI. The DOI should also be obligated to publish the public responses to consultation efforts and, if applicable, the reasons why it
did not adopt the public comments.
c. Dispute Resolution and Enforcement
7. A WUA should be responsible for addressing disputes between its
members. The functions and duties of the WUA set out in the IR
must be amended accordingly. The arbitration board procedure used
by VDCs, 3 5 including the ability to appeal to the relevant district
courts, should be the model for WUAs. For disputes between WUA
members in different districts, one arbitrator from each WUA should
be appointed, along with a mutually acceptable representative from
the DOI. For disputes between WUAs themselves, a similar approach
to the VDC arbitration might be adopted. VDC arbitration procedures require the District Irrigation Office to draw up a list of possible
arbitrators, and the parties choose three arbitrators from the list who
are mutually acceptable. Disputes involving WUAs in separate districts might be heard by a representative from the lists of both dis-

233. This will also achieve greater participation from sharecroppers, because the
WUA will be required to include all users, not just landowners and tenants. However,
this is not an ideal solution because it may adversely affect absentee landlords. Nevertheless, it will alleviate some of the current problems.
234. See also supra Part IV.E. (exemplifying the decisions where this requirement
should apply).
(Nepal),
34
(1999)
Act
§
Self-Governance
Local
235. See
http://www.undp.org/governance/marrakechcdrom/concepts/HMG%20Nepal%20%20Local%2OSelf%2OGovernance%20Act.pdf (last visited May 1, 2005). See also supra
Part V.E. (discussing the arbitration board system).
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tricts, with a third member potentially coming from a list drawn up at
a national level.
8. The decisions of the district offices of the DOI and the DWRC
should be open to challenge. For example, aggrieved parties should
have recourse to a committee made up of members of the Ministry of
Water Resources and MOPE, or alternatively, the district courts if the
dispute is confined to a single district or higher courts if it involves
more than one district.
9. Responsibility for policing water theft within irrigated areas should
be transferred from the DOI to the relevant WUA. This will require
amending Rule 40 of the Irrigation Regulations. The WUA constitutive documents should reflect these changes. Similarly, since the responsibility for repairing damage to canal infrastructure within the irrigated area belongs to corresponding WUA, that WUA should have
the power to recover the costs of any repairs in the event of wilful
damage by its members. The constitutive documents must clearly set
out duties of members and explicitly state that transgressors will be assessed costs, or even penalties.

